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Reviews of American Sāmoa, Hawai‘i, 
Niue, Sāmoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
and Wallis and Futuna are not 
included in this issue.
Cook Islands
As the 49th year of Cook Islands 
“self-governing” in free association 
with New Zealand, the period under 
review has been characterized by a 
number of political ups and downs, 
culminating in a snap election with 
contested results and court action 
set to determine the outcome. The 
results highlight the need for reform 
to address the disparity of the value 
of a vote across the country. As 2014 
is also the International Year of Small 
Islands Developing States, interna-
tional and local attention is focused 
on the country’s development partner-
ships as it prepares to celebrate its 
unique form of sovereignty in 2015. 
Other issues this year revolved around 
a rollout of tax reforms, marine 
resources, and the management of the 
climate change–related drought in the 
southern group islands. 
The Cook Islands continues to 
place priority on climate change and 
climate-related disaster risks, with 
a number of southern group islands 
“dealing with drought-like condi-
tions after months without decent 
rainfall” (cin, 16 Dec 2013). On Atiu, 
groundwater supplies were at criti-
cally low levels. These problems were 
further compounded with increased 
demands expected over the Christmas 
period and the drought conditions 
forecast to extend the dry season 
(cin, 16 Dec 2013). With two water 
treatment plants and a desalination 
machine dispatched from Rarotonga, 
the New Zealand High Commission 
added its support by supplying one 
of the solar-powered water-treatment 
plants as part of a nz$225,000 grant 
to support the Cook Islands drought 
response strategy. The strategy 
includes equipment, training, aware-
ness raising, and water level monitor-
ing and reporting (cin, 31 Jan 2014). 
On a much larger scale, the nz$60 
million Cook Islands Water Partner-
ship, or Te Mato Vai, linked to climate 
change, is intended to improve water 
 supply and  quality on Rarotonga. The 
initiative will refurbish water intakes, 
increase water storage and treatment, 
and replace ring mains and piping 
(cin, 19 Oct 2013). Funding for the 
project has been raised, with nz$22 
million from the Cook Islands gov-
ernment, a nz$15 million grant from 
New Zealand, and a nz$23 million 
concessional loan from the People’s 
Republic of China. This jointly funded 
partnership has drawn international 
attention and is “believed to be a 
first for the emerging Asian country 
which has  traditionally been known 
to deliver aid unilaterally” (cin, 
12 Sept 2013). Visiting researcher 
Philippa Brant of the Lowy Institute 
for International Policy in Australia 
suggested that because the Pacific 
faced no current military conflict, the 
Cook Islands was ideal for Beijing 
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to test out its new aid strategy while 
avoiding accusations of self-interest by 
allowing the Cook Islands and New 
Zealand to drive the project (cin, 12 
Sept 2013). Locally the project also 
drew attention through public meet-
ings and consultations on the Water 
Master Plan. With construction due to 
start on 14 April 2014, a petition with 
over two thousand signatures was 
delivered to Parliament seeking to put 
a stop to the project “until misgiv-
ings and shortcomings on the project 
can be identified and investigated and 
other options explored,” said James 
Thomson, spokesman for the Te Mato 
Vai Petition Committee (cin, 5 April 
2014). It was agreed that a Parlia-
mentary Select Committee would be 
established; however, the project still 
proceeded.
Since the 2011 establishment of the 
Climate Change Division in the Office 
of the Prime Minister, a number of 
initiatives have commenced. A us$5 
million Adaptation Fund project facili-
tated the development of a national 
climate-change policy. In November 
2013, the Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate 
and Disaster Compatible Develop­
ment Policy 2013–2016 was launched. 
In taking an integrated approach, 
the policy is focused on low-carbon, 
climate-change–and disaster-resilient 
development. Prime Minister Henry 
Puna’s introductory statement notes 
that the policy, by integrating with 
existing policy instruments and plan-
ning tools, “builds on our existing 
structures and draws on our capability 
to lift our game” and its “fundamental 
message is to prepare today for tomor-
row” (Cook Islands Government 
2013, 2).
With a reputation for punching 
above its weight, a potential game 
lifter for the Cook Islands lies in its 
ability to deliver on the government’s 
optimistic energy security goals. 
Targets of 50 percent of electricity to 
be supplied from renewable energy 
sources by 2015 and 100 percent 
by 2020 are looking attainable with 
the help of old and new develop-
ment friends. Support from a range 
of donors has been negotiated. This 
includes a nz$20.5 million project to 
design and construct solar-powered 
hybrid energy systems on Manihiki, 
Rakahanga, Penrhyn, Pukapuka, 
Nassau, and Palmerston to enable 
these communities to move toward 
95 percent reliance on solar power. 
New Zealand company Power Smart 
has been contracted and is expected 
to start in August 2014 (cin, 12 June 
2014). In addition, another New Zea-
land company, Infratec Renewables 
(NETcon International) was awarded 
a nz$3.3 million contract funded by 
New Zealand and the European Union 
to install a 960-kilowatt solar fan at 
the Rarotonga Airport. Construction 
on that project commenced in April 
2014 (cin, 29 April 2014). How-
ever, it was not all plain sailing, with 
local businessman and Chamber of 
Commerce President Steve Anderson 
 questioning decisions to send hazard-
ous lead-acid batteries rather than 
lithium-ion batteries to a number of 
low-lying atolls as part of the renew-
able energy plans. 
Given the potential of aid being tied 
to a donor country’s foreign and trade 
policies, and noting the nature of the 
relationship between the Cook Islands 
and New Zealand, such decisions are 
perceived as the Cook Islands govern-
ment’s not wanting “to rock the boat 
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too much with New Zealand and Aus-
tralia and China and Japan who are 
the donors, so . . . they’re being guided 
by the donors who basically lay down 
the criteria of what’s going to be 
given,” said Anderson in an interview 
on Radio Australia (Fayle 2014). 
Cook Islands efforts at the interna-
tional level took forward three policy 
priorities of loss and damage, climate-
change adaptation, and climate-change 
financing to the 19th meeting of the 
United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (unfccc) 
Conference of Parties in Warsaw, 
Poland, in November 2013. The 
delegation leader (and one of seven 
women on the eight-member team), 
Ana Tira‘a, in commenting on the 
importance of attending such meet-
ings and seeking global agreement to 
address climate-change impacts, said, 
“In our northern atolls there are some 
areas that are less than 300 metres 
wide—ocean on one side, lagoon on 
the other. Losing a little bit of land has 
a big impact on low lying communities 
with limited land area. Loss of land 
is not easily replaced” (cin, 18 Nov 
2013). 
During the period under review, the 
Cook Islands gave support to regional 
climate-change efforts. Prime Minister 
Puna, as the outgoing Pacific Islands 
Forum chair, attended the 44th Forum 
in the Marshall Islands in September 
2013, adding his signature to the 
Majuro Declaration, but not before 
calling on the leaders to support the 
Nansen Initiative on climate-change– 
and disaster-induced displacement 
and the Oceans 21 initiative for the 
sustainable development of the Pacific 
oceanscape (pifs 2013). 
Marine resource policy issues also 
featured during this review year. With 
an exclusive economic zone of over 
200 million square kilometers of 
ocean, the Cook Islands establishment 
of a marine protected area continues 
moving toward being “legally desig-
nated and zoned by the end of 2015” 
(cin, 22 Feb 2014). Situated in the 
southern region, the marine park will 
cover an area of approximately 1.1 
million square kilometers. Following 
extensive consultations across the pa 
enua (islands), Marae Moana Marine 
Park Project Manager Jacqui Evans 
stated that “we don’t want to prevent 
opportunities for the country to use 
its marine resources but we want to 
see our ecosystems being sustained 
because they provide so much for us 
in terms of food, shelter, recreation, 
medicine, income through tourism and 
basic ecosystem services such as water 
treatment and coastal protection” 
(cin, 14 May 2014). Meanwhile, with 
zoning providing varied protections 
within the Marae Moana area, the 
government continues in developing 
the institutional and regulatory frame-
work to enable the mining of mineral 
deposits from the seabed. Located 
predominately through the central and 
northern parts of Cook Islands waters, 
at depths of up to 6,000 meters, man-
ganese nodules rich in cobalt, nickel, 
and copper are said to offer 10 billion 
tonnes of mineable resources (Cook 
Islands Seabed Minerals Authority 
2014). With the government’s eye 
on the potential economic benefits 
as an opportunity to diversify the 
country’s narrow economic base, the 
environmental and social implications 
continue to be raised as prominent 
concerns by cultural and environmen-
tal watchdog groups. After a public 
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session of a Seabed Minerals regional 
workshop focused on financial aspects 
of deep-sea minerals and attended by a 
range of international representatives, 
Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Com-
missioner Paul Lynch said the meeting 
“was hijacked by people who didn’t 
want to listen or ask questions of our 
panel” (cin, 19 May 2014). Attend-
ees included members of the national 
environment organization, Te Ipu-
karea Society, which took the opportu-
nity to raise questions about cultural, 
legal, and environmental issues. While 
frustration and discomfort levels rose 
during the meeting, the incident high-
lighted that this is an area of economic 
development that will draw locals out 
of their shells.
This year under review saw a num-
ber of tax reforms rolled out. Tax rate 
thresholds were amended and welfare 
payments were increased, making 
more money available for low-income 
earners. While many of these measures 
were seen as favorable, the increase 
in Value Added Tax to 15 percent 
was less popular, with price increases 
expected to be passed on to consumers 
(cin, 3 Jan 2014). 
The instigation of back taxing 
pensioners who collect New Zealand 
superannuation was also unpopular. 
The reform saw the Revenue Man-
agement Division of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Management 
take money directly out of pension-
ers’ bank accounts. Such was the 
outcry that a pensioners lobby group 
was formed. Known as Grey Power, 
they campaigned against the taxing 
of pensions, with a march on Parlia-
ment in December 2013. Opposition 
leader and Member of Parliament 
Wilkie Rasmussen found favor with 
protesters when he announced that the 
Democratic Party would abolish the 
back tax (cin, 27 Feb 2014). However, 
the government showed its ability to 
take heed of its constituents’ voices 
and undertook to amend the legisla-
tion and refund pensioner back taxes 
(cin, 19 April 2014). 
On the islands of Rarotonga, the 
Murienua district by-election was 
announced for 19 September. This 
 followed the resignation of Deputy 
Prime Minister Tom Masters and his 
inauguration on 9 August as the new 
queen’s representative. 
The Cook Islands Party candidate 
Kaota Tuariki won the seat, beating 
Democratic Party candidate James 
Beer. However, alleged bribery and 
treating claims saw Tuariki resign 
before the petition went to court 
(cin, 14 Jan 2014). A rerun of the 
by-election was set for February. This 
time James Beer was successful over 
the Cook Islands Party’s Tare Mareiti, 
leaving the Cook Islands Party with 13 
seats, the Democratic Party 10 seats, 
and Norman George holding one seat 
as an independent. 
Since her appointment in 2012 as 
the non-elected Speaker of the House, 
well-regarded former Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Cook Islands Red Cross 
Niki Rattle has been kept busy inside 
and outside of parliamentary sittings. 
The termination of the Clerk of Parlia-
ment Tupuna Rakanui, a long-serving 
member of staff, featured in 2013. 
Rakanui, who was appointed in Janu-
ary 2013 following the retirement 
of Nga Valoa, was discharged of his 
duties in August after a review of his 
performance. 
In reaction to the termination, 
Democratic Party Member of Parlia-
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ment for Titikaveka Selena Napa and 
stalwart Atiu Member of Parliament 
for Teenui-Mapumai Norman George 
waded in to publically question the 
termination. Prime Minister Puna 
would not be drawn into commenting 
out of respect for “the authority of the 
Speaker in maintaining responsibility 
over any employment issues” (cin, 20 
Aug 2013). 
In consolation for his termination, 
Rakanui was appointed back into par-
liamentary services in the role of clerk 
to the Are Ariki (House of Paramount 
Chiefs), an appointment advocated 
for by the head of the Are Ariki, Tou 
Ariki (cin, 12 Sept 2013). 
The subsequent appointment of 
Pastor John Tangi as clerk of Parlia-
ment drew a reaction from the opposi-
tion party leader Wilkie Rasmussen 
(cin, 19 Sept 2013). Despite Tangi’s 
suitability based on his previous expe-
rience as Speaker of the House and a 
Democratic Party member of Parlia-
ment for Tupapa, Rasmussen alleged 
interference by the prime minister and 
the Speaker in the appointment (cin, 
14 Sept 2013). 
The period of review was also 
marked by the passing of two promi-
nent figures. The paramount chief of 
the Puaikura district on Rarotonga, 
Tinomana Ruta Tuoro Ariki, passed 
away on 27 June 2013. She held the 
title for over twenty years after her 
investiture in 1991. Affectionately 
known as “Mama Bear,” her services 
extended beyond her tribal boundar-
ies to a number of nongovernmental 
organizations and groups. Of note, 
in 1984 she was a founding member 
of the Cook Islands National Council 
of Women, and in 1988 she became 
the first woman deacon on Rarotonga 
for the Nikao Cook Islands Christian 
Church (cin, 2 July 2013). 
On 24 August Samoan resident 
Tamanavao Navy Epati passed away 
suddenly after suffering a heart attack 
at the Rarotonga Golf Course at age 
49. Well known in Sāmoa and the 
Cook Islands, he was a representative 
athlete and national sports administra-
tor for rugby, rugby league, and box-
ing. Epati was the head of the Ministry 
of Marine Resources and held the post 
of public service commissioner for five 
years until September 2011 (cin, 26 
Aug 2013). During that time he led 
public service reforms, which included 
the passing of the much-needed Public 
Service Act in 2009.
Another passing of sorts also 
eventuated during the year of review. 
Investigations by authorities of Cabi-
net Minister Teina Bishop’s business 
dealings remain unresolved, with no 
decision despite assistance from New 
Zealand’s Serious Fraud Office (cin, 
14 June 2014). The investigation 
surrounded the 2012 purchase, sale, 
and trading of two fishing boats, the 
Orongo and the Bounty, to Huanan 
Fishery (Cook Islands) Limited, a sub-
sidiary of Luen Thai Fishing Venture, 
without the Business Trade Investment 
Board’s approval to sell to an offshore 
buyer, and the granting of a fishing 
license to the company approved by 
Bishop as minister of marine resources 
(cin, 1 Aug 2013; cih, 10 July 2013). 
With the allegations potentially posing 
a threat to the credibility and survival 
of the Cook Islands Party–led govern-
ment, Puna accepted Bishop’s deci-
sion to hand in the marine resources 
and pearl authority portfolios while 
investigations took place. Initially this 
led Bishop to relinquish his marine 
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resources and tourism portfolios in 
early August, but Bishop remained a 
cabinet minister, retaining the educa-
tion portfolio. There was speculation 
that the investigation of Bishop as a 
long-serving cabinet member might 
have had some bearing on his consid-
eration for the deputy prime minister 
position, which had also been vacated 
in August. Four months later, in 
December, Teariki Heather was named 
deputy prime minister, with Bishop 
himself believing that the investigation 
was the reason he was not appointed 
to the role (cin, 18 Dec 2013).
By April, discord within the cabinet 
had taken hold, resulting in Bishop’s 
resignation from the party. In the 
midst of a Parliament sitting and 
with the supplementary budget to be 
presented on 15 April, the no-show 
by Bishop and Tupapa Member of 
Parliament George Maggie reduced 
the Cook Islands Party one-seat 
majority of 13 to 11 (cin, 17 April 
2014). On 17 April, Queen’s Repre-
sentative Tom Marsters was advised 
to dissolve Parliament. Initially he 
said that “it is necessary to have early 
elections because of the need to have 
the incoming government in place well 
in advance of the 50th anniversary 
of self-government in 2015” (cin, 
17 April 2014). 
With the general election set for 
9 July 2014, the prime minister also 
had a “conflict of interest” allega-
tion to deal with. This related to his 
pearl farm in Manihiki, which was 
allegedly set to gain over nz$100,000 
in  assistance as part of a nz$3 mil-
lion aid funding from New Zealand 
to revitalize the pearl industry in the 
Cook Islands (cin, 20 May 2014). 
The current government assumed 
a caretaker role in order to manage 
the country’s affairs in the run-up to 
the snap election. Legislative matters 
due to be tabled in the April sitting of 
Parliament have now been benched 
until after the election. These matters 
included the 2013–14 supplementary 
budget, which is intended to rectify 
the unpopular taxing of pensions and 
to fund the rebuilding of two schools 
that were damaged by arson attacks in 
2013 (cin, 14 April 2014). 
Finance Minister Mark Brown 
expected to keep rolling out exist-
ing commitments, while provisions 
within the constitution allow for a 1.5 
percent expenditure of the 2013–14 
nz$200 million annual budget as an 
administrative measure to address 
funding gaps created by the policy 
changes. No new initiatives will be 
addressed until after the election (cin, 
14 April 2014). Parliamentary select 
committees were also dissolved until 
after the election. This includes the 
committee convened to review the Te 
Mato Vai major infrastructure water 
project in response to the public peti-
tion (cin, 14 April 2014). 
Political campaigning for the early 
July general election dominated the 
final quarter of this year of review 
and culminated in preliminary results 
showing no clear majority winner. 
Of the 24 parliamentary seats, elec-
tion night results had the Democratic 
Party ahead with 11 seats, followed by 
the Cook Islands Party with 10 seats. 
The newly formed Cook Islands One 
had 2 seats and the Mangaia seat of 
 Tamarua tied. Following the recount 
and additional special and postal 
votes, the results swung to give the 
Cook Islands Party a 13-seat major-
ity to lead the country. Despite the 
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Cook Islands Party being out-polled 
by the Democratic Party, the result 
highlights “the disparity in the value 
of a vote across the Cook Islands” 
(cin, 23 July 2014), with the balance 
of power  sitting with smaller voter 
 constituencies. 
The Democratic Party, now with 
eight seats, saw their leader Wilkie 
Rasmussen lose his seat by 10 votes. 
The Mitiaro seat they won on election 
night came back tied after the recount, 
with both candidates garnering 50 
votes each (cin, 18 Jul 2014). A by-
election will be needed to sort out the 
deadlock unless a petition to the court 
proves successful for either party. 
On that note, by the 25 July dead-
line, nine electoral petitions had been 
lodged with the Cook Islands High 
Court. As the post-election  caretaker 
 government, the Cook Islands Party 
will now have to wait for the outcome 
of the court actions. With the con-
stitutional provisions to enable the 
caretaker  government to operate with 
one quarter of the 2013–14 govern-
ment appropriations until the end of 
September, the pressure is now on the 
judiciary and Chief Justice Thomas 
Weston, rather than the voting public, 
to determine the country’s govern-
ment for the next four years. While 
the year has featured a full range of 
political challenges and government-
led reforms that have been contested 
and debated by the public, it is likely 
that the upcoming celebrations of fifty 
years of Cook Islands sovereignty will 
provide a positive focus for 2014–15. 
christina newport
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French Polynesia
The political situation of French 
Polynesia during the period under 
review was in two ways fundamen-
tally different from previous periods. 
First, as a result of May 2013 elec-
tions, there is a two-thirds majority 
for Gaston Flosse’s anti-independence 
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Tahoeraa Huiraatira Party in the 
legislative assembly that is most likely 
to remain for the full term, setting 
the present situation apart from the 
preceding decade-long instability 
caused by  constantly changing politi-
cal majorities. Yet the pending retrials 
of President Flosse (who was earlier 
sentenced to jail terms for corruption, 
which he had appealed) as well as his 
advancing age (he turned eighty-three 
in June 2013) make it doubtful that he 
will retain the presidency for the entire 
five-year term. 
Second, due to the tireless efforts of 
Flosse’s pro-independence predecessor 
Oscar Temaru and his administration 
to reinscribe the country on the United 
Nations list of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (nsgts), which succeeded 
literally on Temaru’s last day in Office 
in May 2013, French Polynesia is 
now regarded by the international 
community as a territory to be decolo-
nized, although France keeps resisting 
what it regards as UN interference in 
its domestic policies. The new inter-
national status of the country gives 
the pro-independence opposition 
unprecedented possibilities to expose 
the country’s problems before interna-
tional audiences and to promote their 
long-term goals of building a sover-
eign state.
Temaru and his confidant, Senator 
Richard Ariihau Tuheiava (one of the 
country’s two representatives in the 
French Senate), thus continued their 
lobbying at UN institutions, where 
they are now able to be admitted as 
official representatives of an nsgt 
and no longer need to find a friendly 
country to include them in its national 
delegation. On 8 October 2013, the 
two testified before the Fourth Com-
mittee of the UN General Assembly, 
which is charged with decolonization 
issues. On 14 October, the commit-
tee adopted a draft resolution to be 
introduced to the floor of the 68th 
UN General Assembly as a follow-up 
to the reinscription resolution of the 
previous session in May. The draft 
 followed Temaru’s and Tuheiava’s 
advice in recommending a long period 
of political education in order to over-
come decades of French indoctrination 
and propaganda before a meaning-
ful referendum of self-determination 
could be conducted in the country 
(United Nations Web tv 2013; ti, 9 
Oct, 21 Oct 2013).
While the resolution was tabled to 
be voted on by the General Assembly 
floor, attempts by President Flosse and 
his government to undo, block, or stall 
the UN decolonization process were 
not successful. Despite yet another 
resolution passed by Flosse’s two-
thirds majority in the French Polynesia 
Assembly on 28 August denouncing 
the UN activities as “interference in 
the bilateral issues between France 
and French Polynesia” and lobbying 
efforts by Flosse to influence Pacific 
Island leaders during the Pacific 
Islands Forum meeting in September 
in Majuro to support this position (ti, 
28 Aug 2013), the leaders preferred 
to be silent on the issue, and the final 
communiqué of the Forum did not 
contain any mention of French Poly-
nesia (pifs 2013). Previously, at the 
Polynesian Leaders Group (plg) meet-
ing in Auckland on 30 August, Flosse, 
who became president of the orga-
nization for a year on a principle of 
alphabetical rotation, had convinced 
the other leaders of the Polynesian 
countries to include in their communi-
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qué a note acknowledging “the resolu-
tion adopted by the French Polynesia 
Assembly reaffirming the democratic 
choice of its population to remain the 
strongly autonomous overseas country 
that it is” (plg 2013), although the 
plg declined to make any concrete 
commitments in support of Flosse’s 
position in the international arena.
The French government, on the 
other hand, also frustrated Flosse, 
since his demand for an immediate 
 referendum on independence that 
would not restrict the electorate to 
long-term residents—which most 
likely would turn out a majority 
against independence—fell on deaf 
ears. When Minister of Overseas 
 Territories Victorin Lurel visited Tahiti 
in late November and gave a program 
speech before the French Polynesia 
Assembly, he declared that there 
was no reason for any independence 
referendum, neither according to UN 
standards on decolonization nor under 
current French electoral law. Instead, 
Lurel asked all local political forces to 
collaborate with the French govern-
ment in developing the country (ti, 
30 Nov 2013).
Temaru and his coalition of opposi-
tion parties, Union Pour La Démocra-
tie (upld), boycotted and protested 
Lurel’s visit, insisting that the Flosse 
government was illegitimate since it 
was run by the “mafia” (referring to 
the multiple criminal convictions of 
Flosse for corruption, all of which 
were undergoing appeals at the time). 
Some protestors went as far as depict-
ing Lurel, a Socialist politician from 
the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe, 
as a “house negro”—in order to 
portray him as a sellout/colonial col-
laborator and simultaneously insult 
him personally by alluding to his black 
Caribbean (= slave descendant) heri-
tage. Lurel was infuriated and accused 
Temaru’s Tavini Huiraatira, the largest 
constituent party within upld and 
official local ally of the ruling French 
Socialist Party, of disloyalty (tpm, Dec 
2013). The minister seemed to forget, 
however, that it was the Socialist Party 
that broke the partnership agreement 
in the first place by opposing UN rein-
scription, which the two parties had 
agreed to in 2004 and 2011. Temaru’s 
party had hitherto dutifully fulfilled its 
part of the agreements by constantly 
lending local support to Socialist poli-
ticians on the French national level. 
A year earlier, in a similar speech 
before the Congress of New Caledonia 
in Nouméa, Lurel had admitted that 
France “never knew how to decolo-
nize” but added that “here [in New 
Caledonia] we are inventing a new 
formula” (ti, 24 Nov 2012). Given 
the attitude of his government toward 
French Polynesia throughout the year, 
as well as other recent colonial poli-
cies such as the départementalisation 
(ie, annexation as a supposed part of 
metropolitan France) of the Comorian 
island of Mayotte in 2011 despite its 
contested international legal status, 
one could conclude that France is 
creating a “new formula” only for 
New Caledonia but remains clueless 
on how to decolonize the rest of its 
crypto-colonial “overseas” empire.
In the old colonial fashion of 
his right-wing predecessors, Lurel 
accepted and replicated Flosse’s 
discourse by claiming that the 2013 
election results should be seen as a 
plebiscite against reinscription. This 
line of argument has frequently been 
used by French governments whenever 
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pro-French parties held the majority of 
seats in the local assembly and reflects 
an unfortunate tradition in French 
political culture of misinterpreting 
elections of candidates to office as 
plebiscites on issues, and vice versa. 
However, in a legal analysis written 
a few days after the UN reinscription 
vote, University of New Caledonia 
Law Professor Mathias Chauchat 
argued that a local election and a 
referendum of self-determination 
should not be confused. Furthermore, 
even the rejection of a particular self-
governing status in a plebiscite should 
not be equated with a vote in favor of 
integration and therefore precipitate 
a removal from the nsgt list, as, for 
example, Tokelau was not removed 
from the list when its voters did not 
consent in sufficient numbers to a 
 status of free association with New 
Zealand in 2007. Echoing Lurel’s 
Nouméa statement, but without the 
hypocrisy of the latter, Chauchat 
argued that “in New Caledonia the 
[French] Republic commits itself to 
a progressive, peaceful and irrevers-
ible process of decolonization, which 
has not turned against her. Her policy 
would become incomprehensible, and 
quickly counter-productive, if she 
would not be able to see the Pacific 
as it is today, as the Anglo-Saxons 
have been able to, and would offer no 
future perspective for French Polyne-
sia” (Chauchat 2013). 
Besides these fundamental legal 
arguments, it is also worth noting that 
neither Tahoeraa nor the pro-French 
opposition group A Tia Porinetia 
(atp) mentioned opposition to rein-
scription in their campaign manifestos. 
While it is true that leading candi-
dates of both parties agitated against 
reinscription during the campaign, the 
absence of the topic in the manifestos 
makes it even more of a stretch to con-
strue votes for the two parties as votes 
against UN reinscription. 
At the same time, however, 
Tahiti-based French historian Jean-
Marc Regnault considers the French 
Polynesia Assembly resolution of 
August 2011 (in which the then upld 
majority expressed itself in favor 
of reinscription) a tactical mistake. 
According to Regnault’s analysis, this 
resolution tied the issue down to one 
of majority support, which would 
eventually backfire on upld, as it no 
longer represents the majority since 
the 2013 elections. In contrast, the 
Kanak pro-independence umbrella 
group flnks (Front de Libéra-
tion Nationale Kanak et Socialiste) 
achieved New Caledonia’s reinscrip-
tion in 1986 without ever attempting 
to get a majority vote of the territo-
rial institutions of New Caledonia 
and instead relied on international 
legal principles that protect minori-
ties, especially indigenous minorities 
 (Regnault 2013, 197, 223 n423).
Unimpressed by the French and 
French Polynesia governments’ oppo-
sition, the UN General Assembly on 
11 December unanimously passed the 
draft as resolution 68/93. The resolu-
tion once more affirms French Poly-
nesia’s inalienable right to self-deter-
mination and calls on France and the 
local government to cooperate with 
UN agencies in order to implement 
this right and, specifically, “to develop 
political education programmes for the 
Territory in order to foster an aware-
ness among the people of French Poly-
nesia of their right to self-determina-
tion in conformity with the legitimate 
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political status options.” Furthermore, 
the resolution “requests the Secretary-
General, in cooperation with relevant 
specialized agencies of the United 
Nations, to compile a report on the 
environmental,  ecological, health and 
other impacts as a consequence of the 
30-year period of nuclear testing in the 
Territory” (UN 2013c).
Whereas the first sections of the 
resolution have merely symbolic 
value as long as both Paris and the 
country government continue refus-
ing any cooperation with the United 
Nations on the matter—Flosse once 
more denounced the resolution as an 
 “unacceptable interference” (ti, 13 
Dec 2013)—the section on nuclear 
testing is of great significance. Up 
until now, the debate on the effects 
of French nuclear testing (1966 to 
1996) was held within the constraints 
of French domestic institutions; the 
resolution officially declares the 
consequences of French nuclear test-
ing an international matter that must 
be addressed at the UN level. Since 
French Polynesia, unlike some totali-
tarian regimes, is not cut off from the 
outside world, France will hardly be 
able to prevent the compilation of the 
UN report on nuclear testing effects, 
even if Paris refuses direct cooperation 
with UN agencies in the matter. 
In the annual UN General Assembly 
report on the nsgts, released on 17 
March 2014, one could see that of all 
seventeen nsgts on the list, the only 
one for which the administering power 
had not transmitted information as 
required under article 73e of the UN 
Charter was French Polynesia (UN 
2014b). France was thus openly defy-
ing principles of international law, but 
this would not discourage UN agen-
cies from accelerating their engage-
ment with the territory. 
On 26 March, the UN Decoloni-
zation Committee released its first 
working paper on the country, giving 
an overview of its political, economic, 
and social situation; listing the resolu-
tions and documents issued hitherto 
by the United Nations in its regard; 
and providing summaries of the testi-
mony given by Temaru and Tuheiava 
before various UN bodies (UN 2014a). 
The document was released in prepa-
ration for the annual regional seminar 
of the Decolonization Committee, 
which took place 21–23 May in 
Nadi, Fiji. While France participated, 
its submission referred only to New 
Caledonia and mentioned not a word 
about French Polynesia (Government 
of France 2014). Senator Tuheiava, 
in his submission as an expert from 
an nsgt, denounced the hypocrisy of 
the French government in adhering 
to UN principles only when it fits its 
interests, and he called on the Special 
Committee to include a passage to 
that effect in a draft resolution for the 
upcoming sixty-ninth General Assem-
bly session. The senator furthermore 
mentioned the control of France over 
the resources in the territory’s Exclu-
sive Economic Zone as well as over its 
airspace as exemplary evidence for the 
lack of true self-government (Tuheiava 
2014).
At the meeting of the Decoloniza-
tion Committee at the UN headquar-
ters in New York, 30 June–1 July, the 
scene from Fiji was repeated. After the 
section on New Caledonia, in which 
French government representatives 
participated, the latter rushed out of 
the chambers when the issue of French 
Polynesia came up for discussion 
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(Overseas Territories Review, 30 June 
2014).
If one analyzes the history of 
French decolonization during the past 
decades, Paris’s arrogant attitude as 
displayed in the UN meetings is not 
very surprising. In his recent book on 
France’s “belated decolonizations” in 
the Pacific, Regnault described how 
it took France decades to accept New 
Caledonia’s 1986 reinscription as an 
nsgt. UN officials were not invited to 
visit New Caledonia until 1999, and 
the annual transmitting of information 
under article 73e was only begun in 
2004 (Regnault 2013, 74–76). In that 
sense, the pattern of France’s attitude 
toward New Caledonia seems to be 
recurring now for French Polynesia, 
almost down to exact details. For 
instance, the line of argument by the 
Françoise Hollande administration 
against French Polynesia’s reinscrip-
tion as being allegedly contrary to 
public majority opinion is virtu-
ally identical to the discourse of the 
cohabitation governments of Mitter-
rand and Chirac in the mid-1980s in 
reference to New Caledonia (Regnault 
2013, 225). While after decades of 
denial of colonialism some progress is 
being made in New Caledonia, decolo-
nization of French Polynesia “still has 
a long history ahead” (Regnault 2013, 
215).
Besides its visible effects on the 
political dynamics of French Polynesia 
and on the problem of belated French 
decolonization in general, the rein-
scription of the country as an nsgt 
also has ramifications for other issues 
of decolonization and related inter-
national legal issues throughout the 
Pacific region. It is interesting to note 
that during the debate on the rein-
scription resolution in the UN General 
Assembly on 17 May 2013, the repre-
sentative of Indonesia, while endorsing 
the resolution, cautioned against using 
it as a precedent to “dismember or 
impair totally or in part the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign 
or independent States”—referring 
most likely to the disputed status of 
West Papua (UN 2013a). While the 
latter is a more complex legal issue 
(involving a sovereignty dispute and 
the denial of self-determination in its 
resolution rather than a classic case of 
denial of decolonization by an admin-
istrative power), Indonesia’s concerns 
over the reinscription resolution show 
its potential for unforeseen far-reach-
ing consequences. 
Ni-Vanuatu Prime Minister Moana 
Carcasses Kalosil, Tahitian by birth 
and leading the one country that has 
consistently supported West Papuan 
self-determination, certainly inter-
preted the resolution in this way in 
his speech before the plenary ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly on 
28  September. He commended the 
reinscription of French Polynesia as 
a recent effort to bring decoloniza-
tion efforts back to life at the United 
Nations, reminding the international 
community of other decolonization-
related issues waiting to be resolved, 
such as West Papua, as well as 
the continuing French claim over 
Vanuatu’s two southernmost islands 
 (Carcasses 2013). 
Geographically closer to French 
Polynesia, Rapa Nui also saw its 
struggle for decolonization from Chile 
significantly affected by the resolution. 
Earlier in 2013, the pro-independence 
umbrella group “Rapa Nui Parlia-
ment” had gained significant inter-
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national momentum by being invited 
by the Temaru government to be a 
founding member of the Polynesian 
Parliamentary Group at its inaugu-
ral meeting in Papeete (ti, 4 March 
2013). During a session of the UN 
Decolonization Committee on 21 
June 2013, the representative of Chile 
first expressed his annoyance that 
a paper on Pacific decolonization 
created in the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues that referred to 
both French Polynesia and Rapa Nui 
was supposedly inaccurate, and then 
he mentioned, truly inaccurately, that 
the country government of French 
Polynesia had less autonomy than 
a municipality in Chile—thereby 
implicitly arguing that French Polyne-
sia could not serve as a precedent for 
Rapa Nui, which currently is admin-
istered as a municipality within Chile 
(UN 2013b). The statement was an 
attempt to curry favor with support-
ers of French Polynesian independence 
and thereby distract from Chile’s own 
atrocious colonial record in relation to 
Rapa Nui. 
Even at the plg meeting in Auck-
land in August 2013, which Flosse 
used as a platform for his propaganda 
as mentioned above, the atmosphere 
of awakening in Pacific decoloniza-
tion and related issues apparently took 
some hold. Kamana‘opono Crabbe, 
the chief executive officer of the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs, attended the 
meeting as an observer representing 
Hawai‘i, which was duly mentioned 
in the communiqué (plg 2013). It 
might not be a coincidence that it 
was Crabbe who in May 2014 would 
 create a stir in Hawaiian politics 
when he sent an open letter to US 
Secretary of State John Kerry about 
the  Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued 
sovereignty under international law 
(Hawaiian Government blog 2014).
As far as domestic developments 
are concerned, the review period saw 
two attempts to introduce new cur-
rency to the country, one successful 
and regular in circumstances and the 
other unsuccessful and rather bizarre. 
Both, however, provide evidence of 
ongoing French colonialism. At the 
beginning of the year, the Institut 
d’Émission d’Outre-Mer (ieom, the 
French central bank for overseas 
territories) issued a new series of 
cfp franc banknotes, which were 
put into circulation during the fol-
lowing months, with the old notes 
gradually phased out by September 
2014. The change in banknote design 
was intended to pay lip service to 
the 1998 Nouméa Accord on New 
Caledonia, which stipulated that the 
future banknotes of New Caledonia 
shall show “Kanak cultural symbols” 
instead of the French colonial officials 
and nondescript “island paradise” 
scenes depicted on the previous series 
(which is issued for all three French 
Pacific territories). While the logi-
cal step would have been to create a 
separate series for New Caledonia 
satisfying the passage in the accord, 
which was originally planned and the 
designs released on a numismatic web-
site (Banknote News 2012), the ieom 
eventually decided to simply create a 
new series for all three Pacific territo-
ries, and only one out of the four new 
notes (the 10,000 francs note) actu-
ally displays Kanak cultural symbols, 
while the other denominations depict 
generic tropical flora and fauna.
While the ieom was making those 
decisions behind closed doors, the 
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so-called Republic of Pakumotu (a 
self-proclaimed entity with about a 
hundred supporters and its headquar-
ters in Outumaoro, within the munici-
pality of Punaauia near its boundary 
with Faaa) announced the issuing of 
its own national currency, called the 
“patu.” In mid-October,  Athanase 
Teiri, the leader of the “republic” 
(who, strangely enough, does not 
style himself as president but as 
“King Taginui I”), announced that his 
 “government” had issued one billion 
patu, which would be put in circula-
tion at the exchange rate of 145 cfp 
francs for one patu and would be the 
only legal tender starting in January 
2014 (ti, 17 Oct 2013). 
Even though most observers looked 
on the actions of the group with mild 
amusement, French prosecutor José 
Thorel announced he would prosecute 
the group for “issuing fake money” 
and would confiscate their patu notes, 
even though they resemble neither 
the old nor the new ieom notes, nor 
do they bear any inscription saying 
they have any value in cfp francs. 
After a Pakumotu supporter tried 
to pay for her gasoline with a patu 
note, the police not only arrested her 
but a few days later also stormed 
into the group’s headquarters, seized 
all the patu notes, and arrested Teiri 
for “counterfeiting” money (ti, 11 
Dec 2013). Eventually, however, the 
court did not follow the prosecutor’s 
excessive actions, and when Teiri was 
sentenced to six months imprison-
ment on Jan 21, it was not for issuing 
“patu” but for intimidation, since he 
had authored letters threatening ieom 
and the territorial government for not 
complying with his “currency-issuing” 
scheme (ti, 21 Jan 2014).
Things turned ugly, however, when 
police arrived at Teiri’s house on 29 
January in order to carry out the sen-
tence and take him to jail, since he had 
not shown up to the court appoint-
ment. The armed bodyguards of the 
“king” opened fire at the approaching 
police cars and a gunfight ensued. 
Luckily no one was injured, and Teiri 
and his bodyguards were arrested 
on charges of attempted murder and 
illegal possession of firearms (tpm, Feb 
2014). 
The “Pakumotu” affair raises 
some important questions. It must be 
asked why people get arrested and 
charged within days for trivial affairs 
like attempting to defraud a business 
of a small amount of money in the 
case of the lady at the gas station, or 
merely for the act of producing tons 
of valueless fantasy money in the 
name of a fantasy state in the case of 
Teiri, whereas for various politicians, 
such as President Flosse, who have 
defrauded the public of the equiva-
lent of hundreds of thousands of US 
 dollars through embezzlement, the 
justice system takes years to prosecute 
them. 
Second, the phenomenon of self-
proclaimed governments—of which 
there are several others in French 
Polynesia, including two more emerg-
ing during the time under review 
(ti, 23 Oct 2013; ti, 26 April, 27 
May 2014)—must be seen in a social 
context. The relative success of these 
eccentric groups is best explained as 
offering a utopian alternative to the 
increasingly desperate situation many 
poor and unemployed Tahitians find 
themselves in. This is even more the 
case as many of the latter become 
progressively disillusioned with tradi-
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tional political parties, none of which 
have offered much to remedy the ever-
aggravating social ills. 
While Flosse and other pro-French 
politicians had constantly denounced 
the Temaru government for its per-
ceived incompetence in dealing with 
such issues and, instead, for its “obses-
sion” with decolonization, the new 
all-powerful Flosse government has 
not done much in its first year in office 
to alleviate the situation either. At the 
beginning, the new government under-
took a few good concrete steps such as 
opening the country’s first shelter for 
homeless people in Tipaerui valley (ti, 
4 June 2013) and announcing reform 
measures, such as the cutting of one 
thousand administrative positions (ti, 
3 July 2013). However, it soon became 
obvious that Flosse’s government 
was not interested in real structural 
reforms but rather in continuing 
“business as usual,” that is, a policy of 
patronage and clientelism. Following 
this pattern, the new Flosse govern-
ment created new posts with question-
able purpose, for instance, reinstalling 
the so-called High Council of French 
Polynesia (an institution supposedly 
providing legal advice to the country 
government that had previously been 
abolished without any visible nega-
tive consequences) and nominating 
new members thereof (ti, 11 July, 29 
Aug 2013), before the controversial 
institution ended up being declared 
illegal by the French Council of State 
(highest administrative court) (tpm, 
March 2014). Controversies also con-
tinued over the appointment of former 
French Minister for Overseas Territo-
ries Brigitte Girardin as the country’s 
“special representative in Paris” (tpm, 
Aug 2013), a quite vaguely defined 
job that appears especially superflu-
ous since there already is a well-staffed 
office representing the territory in 
Paris. In the same context of purely 
patronage politics should be seen 
the appointment of Teiva Manutahi, 
leader of a small political party that 
had joined Tahoeraa for the second 
round of the 2013 elections, to the 
similarly vague position of “mediator 
of French Polynesia” (ti, 5 July 2013). 
In November 2013, the Flosse gov-
ernment went through its first major 
crisis when Bruno Marty, the minister 
for transport infrastructure, resigned 
after crashing his car while driving 
drunk. The irony of the situation 
was not lost on the opposition and 
the media, but, instead of punishing 
Marty’s scandalous behavior by sever-
ing all ties with him, Flosse announced 
he would appoint him director of a 
semi-public company (pir, 18 Nov 
2013; tpm, Dec 2013). 
Marty’s resignation triggered a 
reshuffling of Flosse’s cabinet. Not 
only was his secretary, Albert Solia, 
appointed to succeed him, but Flosse 
also created a ninth cabinet portfolio 
for Manolita Ly, who became minister 
for labor, social, and family issues, 
while the other portfolios were redis-
tributed among the remaining seven 
ministers (ti, 17 Nov 2013).
During the final months of 2013 
another controversy struck Tahitian 
society, namely, the attempt by Hishan 
El-Barkani, an ethnic Arab Islamic 
cleric from France, to establish a 
mosque in downtown Papeete. Other 
than a few ethnic Arab French set-
tlers, there are virtually no Muslims 
in Tahiti. Al-Barkani, however, started 
a campaign to convert Tahitians to 
Islam, and indeed a few local individu-
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als joined his congregation (nt, 15 Oct 
2013). Many local inhabitants were 
outraged by this, and the specter of 
Islamic fundamentalism was raised. 
On 9 November, about four hundred 
people marched through Papeete, 
demanding the closure of the Islamic 
community center El-Barkani had 
 created in a Papeete office building 
and supporting a liberal and secu-
lar society (ti, 9 Nov 2003). While 
such concerns seem understandable, 
it should also be recalled that Tahiti 
has for decades hosted a  synagogue, a 
Chinese Taoist temple, a few revived 
temples of traditional Polynesian 
religion, as well as churches of various 
Christian denominations (including 
some that are fundamentalist)—all 
without precipitating comparable 
reactions. 
Party politics hit the headlines again 
when the municipal elections, held on 
23 and 30 March 2014 in a complex 
two-round system, were approach-
ing. The results mainly confirmed the 
existing political landscape, but the 
“orange wave” of 2012 and 2013, 
referring to the Tahoeraa Party colors, 
did not continue. Most of the mayors 
affiliated with Tahoeraa kept their 
offices, and Tahoeraa actually gained 
two more municipalities, but at the 
price of losing two others. Papeete 
Mayor Michel Buillard (Tahoeraa) 
was reelected, and in Pirae, Flosse’s 
son-in-law and French National 
Assembly member Edouard Fritch, 
who had already been mayor from 
2000 to 2008, won an overall major-
ity against atp-affiliated incumbent 
Béatrice Vernaudon. In Mataiea, upld 
incumbent Tina Cross was defeated 
by Tahoeraa candidate Tearii Alpha in 
the first round, but in the neighboring 
municipal district of Papeari,  Tahoeraa 
incumbent and French National 
Assembly member Jonas Tahuaitu sur-
prisingly lost the mayoralty. Tahoeraa 
also lost the mayoralty of President 
Flosse’s home island of Mangareva 
when the incumbent mayor was not 
reelected.
Despite all predictions by pro-
French leaders, upld was able to 
hold on to its stronghold of Faaa, 
where the list of ex-president Oscar 
Temaru (mayor of Faaa since 1983) 
won a two-thirds majority in the first 
round. Temaru’s lieutenant and former 
Assembly Speaker Jacqui Drollet also 
won reelection as deputy mayor of 
his home district of Hitiaa on Tahiti’s 
east coast. The anticipated victory of 
upld in the entire East Coast munici-
pality, of which Hitiaa is a constituent 
district, was prevented by the resigna-
tion of several Tahoeraa municipal 
councilors, which precipitated fresh 
by-elections. A similar tactic was used 
in the Western Taiarapu municipality. 
These cases aside, upld was not able 
to further extend its municipal power 
base, since it lost the Moorea island 
municipality when its upld incum-
bent mayor, Raymond Van Bastolaer, 
missed reelection. 
atp, the third political force, held 
on to its strongholds. Incumbent atp 
mayors Ronald Tumahai of Punaauia 
and Philip Schyle of Arue were con-
firmed in office, as well as former 
President Gaston Tong Sang, who 
retained the mayoralty of Bora Bora. 
The city of Uturoa on Raiatea, as well 
as Ua Pou island in the Marquesas, 
remained in the hands of atp, and 
Mangareva’s new mayor is an atp 
affiliate as well (ti, 26 March, 1 April 
2014; tpm, April 2014). 
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The elections were overshadowed 
by multiple strikes of municipal 
employees throughout the coun-
try. According to Tahiti­Pacifique 
 Magazine editor Alex du Prel, the 
strikes gave evidence, first, of the 
 corruption of trade union leaders 
who have regularly been using strikes 
as a sort of protection racket to get 
 concessions from politicians, and, 
second, of the impracticality of new 
municipal  service standards that have 
been imposed by France as binding 
by the beginning of 2014 but that are 
beyond the capacities of most munici-
palities (tpm, April 2014; pir, 26 
March 2014).
The municipal by-elections in the 
Tahiti East Coast municipality on 15 
and 28 June brought no change, as 
upld-affiliated Dauphin Domingo 
won the mayoralty, rendering the 
Tahoeraa challenge to the original 
results a waste of taxpayer money. 
Since French law no longer allows for 
the concurrent holding of national 
assembly membership and local 
political office, Edouard Fritch had to 
resign from his national assembly seat 
on his inauguration as mayor of Pirae, 
which necessitated a by-election for 
the first constituency (including the 
municipalities of Papeete, Pirae, and 
Arue on Tahiti as well as the Tuamotu 
and Marquesas Islands), also held 
on 15 and 28 June. Unsurprisingly, 
Tahoeraa candidate Maina Sage won 
in the second round, but the score 
of opposing upld candidate Tauhiti 
Nena (41.98%) was significantly 
higher than that of Fritch’s 2012 upld 
opponent Pierre Frébault (36.78 %) 
(ti, 30 June 2014; tpm, Aug 2014).
Overall it became clear that despite 
doomsday scenarios predicted after 
the election loss in May 2013, upld 
was still a force to be reckoned with. 
On the first anniversary of the coun-
try’s UN reinscription, a monument 
was unveiled in Faaa at the end of 
a commemoration march that was 
attended by about four thousand sup-
porters and sympathizers (tpm, June–
July 2014). 
Support for upld was also shown 
during the European Parliament elec-
tions on 25 May, when the majority 
of votes cast in the country were won 
by the Tavini-supported Socialist list. 
However, participation was extremely 
low, with only 14.97 percent vot-
ing in an election that most people 
see as irrelevant for the territory. 
Tahoeraa had decided to boycott the 
vote, mainly as a strategy to then 
proclaim the overwhelming number 
of abstentions as actual votes in favor 
of  Tahoeraa—a contentious logic 
furnishing a fit occasion for upld to 
denounce Flosse as a hypocrite and 
question his self-proclaimed loyalty to 
the institutions of the French Repub-
lic. In any case, besides the hot air 
thus created, the election proved not 
practically relevant for the country, 
since the three seats assigned to French 
overseas territories in the EU parlia-
ment were won by candidates from 
other overseas possessions (ti, 25 
May, 26 May 2014). 
In terms of economic development, 
the Flosse government did take a few 
promising steps to encourage foreign 
investment in the country. In Decem-
ber, Flosse visited China to initiate 
the negotiation of business deals with 
various Chinese companies (tpm, Jan 
2014). One of those projects, which 
has been in the making for several 
years, is the creation of a tuna farm in 
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the lagoon of one of the atolls of the 
Tuamotu Archipelago. On 25 Febru-
ary, the country government signed a 
contract with the Chinese company 
Tian Rui International Investment, 
which promised to invest 150 billion 
cfp francs (approximately us$1.66 
billion) over fifteen years in order 
to create the fish farm. The lagoon 
of Makemo atoll was chosen as the 
site of the aquaculture project (tpm, 
March 2014). It is interesting to note 
that the negotiations for the project 
had started under the Temaru govern-
ment and that as long as Flosse was in 
the opposition, he had denounced this 
and other Chinese investment projects 
as evidence that Temaru was “selling 
out our country to the Chinese.”
Whether the project will ever be 
realized or, like so many before, will 
remain an empty promise doomed to 
economic failure is still unclear. Only 
a few months after the contract was 
signed, the project was once more 
revised, with the location moved to 
Hao atoll instead of Makemo. As 
the site of a former French naval and 
air force base that supported nuclear 
testing on the atolls farther southwest, 
Hao has an existing infrastructure that 
would facilitate the building of the 
farm (ti, 9 May 2014). The new site 
choice precipitated new controversies, 
however, since the project required the 
expropriation of land, which many of 
Hao’s inhabitants were not happy to 
give up (ti, 1 June 2014), having had 
many of their lands already expropri-
ated for the military base. 
Conflicts like these remind us of 
the complex issue of land tenure in 
the country, which has been a source 
of contention for more than a century, 
starting with the colonial superimposi-
tion of French civil law in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries 
over previously existing customary 
land systems. Land tenure issues also 
surfaced near the golf course in Atima-
ono, where Flosse ordered the eviction 
of families living on what the govern-
ment considers public land in order to 
make place for another joint venture 
with Chinese capital (ti, 7 Jan 2014).
Another project that has long been 
in the planning stages by the Papeete 
Port Authority, supported by both 
previous and current country govern-
ments, is to upgrade the commercial 
port of Papeete to serve as a regional 
trade hub for the Southeastern Pacific, 
similar to the way Suva does for the 
Southwestern Pacific. However, tpm 
editor du Prel cautioned against being 
too optimistic about this scheme, 
since currently port operations are 
six times more expensive in Papeete 
than in Suva and since the potential 
foreign destinations to be supplied 
by Papeete (Cook Islands, Pitcairn, 
Christmas Island) are minimal in size, 
with merely one-tenth of the domes-
tic population of French Polynesia 
and a much lower purchasing power, 
thus making a port with high costs of 
operation even less attractive for them 
(tpm, March 2014).
On 14 April, the government 
released a stimulus plan, elaborated 
by Vice President and Finance Min-
ister Nuihau Laurey. It consisted 
mainly of a few suggestions to reduce 
bureaucracy, while at the same time 
creating new bureaucratic entities and 
new subsidies to stimulate economic 
growth but nothing that touches the 
basis of the economic system. Du 
Prel commented that local economy 
“essentially consists of a bubble fed 
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by the transfers and subsidies from 
France,” which feed an artificial sys-
tem of economy based on consump-
tion, a “colonial trading post economy 
that is limited to the urban population 
and the politico-administrative caste 
of Tahiti” (tpm, May 2014). 
How important a major overhaul 
of the entire economic system and the 
creation of genuine economic growth 
would be is dramatically shown by 
the enormous French subsidies that 
constitute the lifeblood of the coun-
try. According to official statistics, in 
2012 France spent 173.813 billion cfp 
francs (us$1.937 billion) in French 
Polynesia, of which only 42 percent 
was spent exercising French govern-
ment responsibilities (defense, internal 
security, justice, audiovisual communi-
cation, tertiary education, etc), while 
51 percent went toward the territorial 
government and 7 percent toward 
the municipalities (tpm, May 2014). 
While New Caledonia is moving away 
from such extreme levels of depen-
dency, and socioeconomic reforms are 
slowly being implemented there, the 
structural problems of French Poly-
nesia remain unsolved. As Regnault 
commented, “In [French] Polynesia it 
seems that, to the contrary, the elites 
entrench themselves behind their 
privileges and refuse any fundamental 
reform” (2013, 213).
As if the aggravating economic situ-
ation was not bad enough, the country 
was also plagued by tropical diseases. 
An epidemic of dengue hit Tahiti 
throughout 2013, and, in addition, 
for the first time there occurred an 
 epidemic of the Zika virus, a disease 
similar to dengue but less virulent (ti, 
31 Oct 2013), and later the Chikun-
gunya virus from Africa was also 
imported (ti, 3 June 2014). All three 
diseases are mosquito-borne and thus 
more heavily affect the poorer sec-
tions of the population, who live in 
crowded shanty settlements on the 
bottom of valleys, with no window 
screens and surrounded by puddles 
and rubbish items that provide ideal 
breeding sites for mosquitoes.
As the poor neighborhoods are 
infested with mosquitoes, the ruling 
classes are infested with corruption. 
Reynald Temarii, the former Tahi-
tian football star involved in a major 
corruption scandal of the Fédération 
Internationale du Football Association 
(fifa) in 2010, once more featured in 
negative headlines, as he turned out to 
be one of the top fifa officials who 
were bribed to award the 2022 World 
Cup to Qatar (tpm, June–July 2014). 
The more sinister affair of the alleged 
murder of anti-Flosse journalist Jean-
Pascal Couraud (known by his byline, 
jpk) by henchmen of the presidential 
militia Groupement d’Intervention de 
la Polynesie (gip) in 1997 received a 
new twist, as new testimony alleged 
that another former gip member who 
committed suicide in 2003 had been 
part of the team, along with Tino 
Mara and Tutu Manate, who have 
been accused of having abducted and 
killed jpk in 1997 on orders of gip 
commander Léonard Puputauki. At 
the end of the review period, the case 
was still under investigation, even 
though murder charges against Mara 
and Manate have been dropped (tpm, 
June–July, August 2014).
Flosse’s government created yet 
another controversy when it decided 
to remove a monument commemorat-
ing the victims of nuclear testing in 
the form of a marae (traditional place 
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of worship and burial), which had 
been built by the test victims associa-
tion Moruroa e Tatou (MeT), from its 
prominent position in a seafront park. 
Whereas the Temaru government had 
renamed the park “2 July 1966” to 
commemorate the first nuclear test, 
Flosse decided to re-rename it after 
former French President Jacques 
Chirac instead (ti, 12 June 2014). 
In a press release, MeT declared its 
shock and outrage. After the firing of 
nuclear-testing expert Bruno Barillot 
from his position in the government, 
the dissolution of the government’s 
Orientation Council for the Follow-
up on the Consequences of Nuclear 
Testing (coscen), and the elimination 
of MeT representation in the Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Council 
(cesc, a lawmaking advisory body 
consisting of civil society representa-
tives), the removal of the monument 
was denounced as Flosse’s final insult 
to the victims of nuclear testing (ti, 
16 June 2014).
To put a good face on the matter, 
shortly after the monument removal, 
the government celebrated the coun-
try’s pan-Polynesian connections, 
albeit in a cultural-only, politically 
“safe” way, by naming a neighbor-
ing seafront park after the visiting 
 Hawaiian voyaging canoe Hōkūle‘a. 
In the center of the park another 
marae was built, which President 
Flosse inaugurated by conferring the 
Order of Tahiti Nui on the Hōkūle‘a’s 
navigator Nainoa Thompson (ti, Aug 
2014).
A major change in the local media 
landscape occurred in May, when the 
daily newspaper Les Nouvelles de 
Tahiti stopped publishing after more 
than five decades in existence, due 
to bad financial management and 
competition from electronic media. 
Tahiti thus became a “one-newspaper 
island,” with La Depêche remaining 
as the only daily. This is regretful, 
since Les Nouvelles usually provided 
deeper and more critical analyses of 
local politics (nt, 23 May 2014, tpm, 
June–July 2014).
The review period also saw the 
passing of three important local per-
sonalities. On 21 August 2013, Marc 
Maamaatuaiahutapu, more commonly 
known as Maco Tevane, passed away 
at age 76. A surveyor and government 
interpreter by profession, Tevane was 
one of the most prolific orators and 
authors in the Tahitian language and 
one of the cofounders in 1972 of the 
Tahitian Academy, of which he served 
as the president for many years (tpm, 
Sept 2013). 
Another prolific writer in Tahitian 
and member of the Academy, Turo a 
Raapoto, died on 7 May 2014 at age 
66. A trained linguist and theologian, 
Raapoto contributed to the academic 
study of the Tahitian language, for 
which he created one of the two cur-
rently used orthographic systems. 
Within the country’s largest religious 
denomination, which was then called 
the Evangelical Church of French 
Polynesia and under his influence 
became the Protestant Maohi Church 
in 2004, he was probably the most 
influential Tahitian intellectual in the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
Initially joined by his colleague Henri 
Hiro, Raapoto developed a Polynesian 
liberation theology, in which tradi-
tional Polynesian culture is syncretized 
with biblical ideas as a way of defend-
ing Maohi (native Polynesian) identity 
against French materialism and the 
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destruction of sacred land through 
nuclear testing. As a key figure in the 
cultural renaissance of the 1970s and 
1980s, Raapoto promoted the term 
Maohi (hitherto rather obscure) as 
a self-designation for the indigenous 
population of the country. With more 
than a dozen theological and linguistic 
books published exclusively in Tahi-
tian, Raapoto made a lasting contri-
bution to the still meager corpus of 
high-quality Tahitian-language texts. 
The country lost one of its politi-
cal veterans providing links between 
current politics and those of the 
mid-twentieth century when, on 
15 May, Jean-Baptiste Heitarauri 
Céran-Jérusalémy passed away at 
the  remarkable age of 93 (dt, 16 
May 2014). A printer and trade-
union activist, Céran-Jérusalemy 
had assisted Pouvanaa a Oopa in the 
1940s to found the party Rassemble-
ment Démocratique des Populations 
Tahitiennes (rdpt), the first political 
movement to institutionalize Tahitian 
anticolonial nationalism and a prede-
cessor to later autonomist and pro-
independence parties. A colorful per-
sonality, Céran-Jérusalemy had been 
Pouvanaa’s deputy throughout most 
of the 1940s and 1950s but had then 
fallen out with the latter and actu-
ally campaigned against him in the 
1958 referendum on the new French 
constitution, after which Pouvanaa 
was arrested and imprisoned. Since the 
1960s, Céran-Jérusalemy had not been 
in elected office but, after reconciling 
with Pouvanaa, continued to support 
various political movements that he 
saw as carrying on Pouvanaa’s legacy, 
developing a pattern of frequently 
switching allegiances, which became 
a quasi-ubiquitous phenomenon in 
local political culture. Even toward the 
end of his life he continued this erratic 
course, only recently switching from 
Temaru’s Tavini Huiraatira to Gaston 
Tong Sang’s pro-French To Tatou Aia 
Party (now a part of atp), yet profess-
ing to still be pro-independence and 
tirelessly advocating for a judicial 
rehabilitation of Pouvanaa. 
Céran-Jérusalemy was lucky to 
witness before his passing one of the 
few positive actions by the French 
government during the review period, 
namely, steps toward retrying the 
1959 case against Pouvanaa. After 
a colonial show trial on trumped-up 
charges, Pouvanaa had been sentenced 
to a decade of forced exile because 
France considered him a nuisance to 
its plans to build the nuclear-weapons 
testing facility that was being planned 
at the time. As a kind of would-be 
founding father of a nation on the 
verge of independence in the late 
1950s, Pouvanaa is today regarded as 
a quasi-national hero by a wide politi-
cal spectrum, epitomizing the tragic 
history of a country led astray from 
the regular path of decolonization by 
French nuclear neocolonialism.
In late February, French Minister of 
Justice Christiane Taubira announced 
that she would initiate a retrial (ti, 
26 Feb 2013). Based on evidence 
gathered through the tireless research 
by historian Regnault in various 
hitherto  classified French archives, 
the Assembly of French Polynesia had 
unanimously voted in early 2013 to 
send an official request to the Ministry 
of Justice for the retrial. 
The affirmative reaction to the 
request, which was commended with 
great satisfaction by both Tahoeraa 
and upld, shows that the Hollande 
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administration can make a positive 
contribution to decolonization. It is 
regrettable that this attitude has not 
spread to other fields of French policy. 
To repeat Regnault’s statement, indeed 
in French Polynesia “decolonization 
still has a long history ahead.”
lorenz gonschor
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Before considering how decolonization 
manifests itself for Māori, we must 
pause to remember those we have lost 
over the past year. Among our leaders 
we bade farewell to were three who 
left important legacies. In September 
2013, we lost Denis Hansen of the 
iwi (tribal nations) of Ngāti Kahu and 
Ngāpuhi. He had worked tirelessly for 
the Māori community and was a love-
able rogue who lit up any gathering 
he walked into. Thousands of people 
had attended his eightieth birthday 
celebration in June.
In February 2014, we lost Nin 
Tomas of the Ngāti Kahu and Te 
 Rarawa nations. As an associate 
professor of law, Nin had trained a 
generation of Māori lawyers, some of 
whom are now judges. They turned up 
in large numbers for her tangihanga 
(funerary ceremony) at the University 
of Auckland’s Waipapa marae. She 
had fought for recognition of the first 
law of New Zealand, tikanga Māori 
(Māori law), and its application to 
environmental issues.
In May 2014, Morvin Simon of 
Te Ātihaunui a Pāpārangi iwi passed 
away. He was a leading music com-
poser and had dedicated his life to 
tutoring kapa haka (dance), compos-
ing songs, and preserving the language 
and customs of his people of the 
Whanganui.
For Māori, decolonization is about 
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removing the oppression and mar-
ginalization visited on us by British 
colonizers and repairing the resultant 
damage. The devastating effects and 
systemic injustices that Māori have 
suffered are the same as those that 
European colonization visited on 
almost all indigenous peoples. The 
 colonization strategies employed by 
the British in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
have been extensively documented: 
genocide; land and other resource 
theft; usurpation of our authority, 
power, and sovereignty; marginal-
ization; banning and denial of our 
language, institutions, and intellec-
tual prowess; and social and cultural 
 dislocation through the systematic 
ripping apart of our communities, 
urbanization, incarceration, and relo-
cation offshore to Australia (Jackson 
2004, 104; Smith 2012, 147; Mutu 
2011; Webb 2012). The diseases of 
poverty that reduce our quality of life 
and shorten our life expectancy, the 
internalized violence born of oppres-
sion, and the despair among young 
Māori shaped by an unemployment 
rate almost four times higher than the 
general population rate are all prod-
ucts of the dispossession wrought by 
colonization (Jackson 2004, 104). 
And this is all in violation of Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi, the 1840 treaty between 
Māori and the British Crown that 
 confirmed Māori sovereignty and 
control of the country and guaranteed 
to the Crown control of her hitherto 
“lawless” subjects. 
Decolonization in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand has therefore focused on 
honoring, upholding, and implement-
ing the treaty. It is about surviving 
as Māori and recovering from the 
devastation of colonization: recover-
ing our lands, resources, and terri-
tories, our language, our social and 
spiritual practices, our history and 
traditions, our identity and rights, 
our wealth and prosperity, our self-
determination and sovereignty (Smith 
2012, 121; Mutu 2011). It is about 
deconstructing the myths of coloni-
zation, breaking free of the Pākehā 
(European) state, reconstructing our 
Māori reality through our own laws 
and culture, and reclaiming effective 
sovereignty. This includes remedying 
the numerous breaches of Te Tiriti and 
restoring the balance between Māori 
as the indigenous owners and para-
mount authority of the country and 
 British immigrants, who are here at 
our invitation and under our author-
ity (Jackson 2004, 101). In the face of 
the often-ruthless exercise of unilateral 
Crown power, Māori have engaged 
in peaceful protest. We also organize 
and run decolonization programs to 
empower our communities to take 
back control of their lives and their 
territories. And we continue to fight 
the government through its own 
tribunal and courts, ever hopeful that 
it will eventually take heed of Māori 
and international pressure to do what 
is right and uphold widely recog-
nized international indigenous human 
rights instruments such as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (unga 2014), 
which it had endorsed in 2010.
Decolonization in New Zealand 
has been painfully slow. Pākehā have 
fought to retain unilateral power 
and privilege, to continue to assert 
White supremacy, and to recreate and 
readjust the myths that underpin these 
assertions. This is the only way they 
can keep justifying their illegitimate 
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status. For Māori, decolonization has 
to start with what is often referred 
to as “decolonization of the mind.” 
The journey has been one fraught 
with political conflict and social strife. 
Since 1840, the colonizers have fought 
to colonize the Māori mind and to 
replace the Pacific history, traditions, 
knowledge, language, laws, and social 
and political power structures of our 
ancestors with those of their culture, 
whose origins lie on the other side of 
the world. Empowering our culture 
to survive by privileging the world of 
our ancestors over that of our English 
visitors can be bewildering and pain-
ful for some. But as the devastation 
of colonization gnaws at the core of 
our existence, and the will to sur-
vive as Māori under our own mana 
(power and authority derived from 
the gods) pervades Māori communi-
ties, submitting to the oppression of 
the colonizer is an option that Māori 
are increasingly rejecting. Decoloniza-
tion wānanga (workshops and semi-
nars) have been operating in Māori 
communities for more than twenty 
years. They work on encouraging oral 
debate, confirming Māori culture and 
identity through our own history, tra-
ditions, language, and values; on iden-
tifying and deconstructing the myths 
of colonization; and on challenging 
us to break free of the suffocating 
oppression of the colonizers and to 
regain control of our lives. Māori 
immersion schools were established in 
the 1980s to ensure that our children 
had the opportunity to learn free of 
White oppression. Māori radio and, 
after lengthy battles, Māori television 
have made important contributions. 
To a certain extent, so have the Māori 
political parties—these days the Māori 
Party and the Mana Party—although 
they have been restricted by the par-
liamentary system they operate within, 
which is defined and controlled by and 
for Pākehā. 
Training Māori lawyers has con-
tributed to some consideration of 
Māori culture in the courts but has yet 
to result in a reduction in the rates of 
Māori incarcerations (Webb 2012). 
Training Māori doctors and health 
professionals has started to improve 
the shocking Māori health statistics. 
On this front, there was a certain 
irony about a young Māori doctor, 
Dr Lance O’Sullivan, being named 
New Zealander of the Year for 2014 
after being named Māori of the Year 
for 2012. He has publicly highlighted 
the racism in the health sector (incur-
ring the wrath of his employers and 
of Pākehā practitioners) and has set 
in place his own programs to combat 
that racism and to address the health 
of Māori children and families in the 
Far North (Mutu 2014, 212). 
At the international level, Māori 
have been engaging with other 
indigenous communities in work-
ing toward the implementation of 
widely recognized international 
human rights instruments such as 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. Alliances have 
been formed not only through United 
Nations groups such as the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, 
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the 
Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, but also through 
numerous exchange visits, indigenous 
conferences and gatherings, and 
international collaborative projects. 
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Despite the progress these initiatives 
have made, it has been clear for many 
decades now that unless major consti-
tutional transformation takes place, 
Māori will remain disadvantaged and 
oppressed in our own land. 
In 2009, the National Iwi Chairs’ 
Forum, an informal group of chair-
persons of iwi, established a work-
ing party to draw up a model for an 
inclusive constitution for Aotearoa/
New Zealand based on tikanga 
(Māori law), He Whakaputanga o 
te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (the 
1835 declaration of Māori sovereignty 
and independence), and Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi, while taking into account 
other indigenous human rights instru-
ments such as the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 
2012 and 2013, the working party, 
named Matike Mai Aotearoa (Arise 
Aotearoa), conducted more than 250 
consultation hui (gatherings) with 
Māori groups throughout the country, 
including many Māori youth groups, 
to discuss the values they wish such 
a constitution to be based on. Pre-
liminary findings indicate the very 
strongly held belief expressed at the 
hui that the Westminster constitutional 
system as introduced by the British 
Crown after 1840 does not—indeed 
cannot—adequately give effect to the 
terms of He Whakaputanga or Te 
Tiriti. In that context, the hui also 
indicated that the current Westminster 
constitutional  system is necessarily at 
odds with tikanga and the values that 
might more adequately provide a just 
and effective means of governance 
of the country. A different type of 
constitutionalism is required. Imple-
menting such a major constitutional 
shift may be difficult but there is a 
clear belief that it is not only neces-
sary, it is fundamental to the ongoing 
and long-term justice of the treaty 
relationship (Jackson and Mutu 2014, 
3–4). Despite Pākehā governments 
being fearful of such change and the 
inevitability of having to share power, 
international standards are now 
well established, and it is becoming 
 increasingly difficult for New Zealand 
to keep evading them.
In the education sector, the govern-
ment has been exposed for  violating 
Māori treaty and human rights. 
Despite acknowledging the Māori 
immersion schools and agreeing to 
resource them, government bureau-
crats have fought to maintain White 
hegemony in the schools, denying 
them resources and interfering in their 
management in order to force compli-
ance with Pākehā cultural norms. In 
2012, the body representing Māori 
immersion preschools, the National 
Kōhanga Reo Trust, successfully pur-
sued a claim to the Waitangi  Tribunal 
aimed at halting this behavior (Wai-
tangi Tribunal 2012). However, in the 
past year the trust has come under 
constant attack as government bureau-
crats and the minister of education, 
who is Māori, refused to address 
the tribunal’s recommendations and 
instead tried to force the trust to come 
under the authority and control of 
the Ministry of Education. The usual 
Pākehā tactics of divide and rule were 
adopted to set Māori communities 
against the trust using spurious claims 
of misappropriation and mismanage-
ment. Lengthy official investigations 
proved there had been no criminal 
wrongdoing. The trust has refused to 
bow to the demands but rather has 
adopted a tikanga approach to restore 
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calm and address the damage caused 
by government interference.
One of the most seriously dysfunc-
tional and deeply harmful aspects 
of the Pākehā education system for 
Māori has been exposed through the 
conviction and sentencing of James 
Parker in August 2013 to preventive 
detention, with a minimum of seven 
years imprisonment, after he was 
found guilty on seventy-four charges 
representing more than three hundred 
sexual offenses against twenty boys. 
Parker, whose parents are English, 
was a teacher who worked in primary 
schools in the Far North, rising to 
the position of deputy principal. As 
part of his work, he gained access to 
and immersed himself in local Māori 
communities. When the police finally 
charged him, he had been sexually 
violating young Māori boys attending 
those schools for more than thir-
teen years. Those who tried to have 
authorities stop him, including the 
headmistress of one school he taught 
at, were not believed. One boy who 
spoke out was forced to apologize to 
Parker and remain in his class. The 
Māori communities in the Far North 
that he had violated for so long have 
often buried knowledge of this type of 
offending because of lack of support 
from authorities (tvnz 2013). Once 
Parker’s offending was publicly recog-
nized, several other pedophiles operat-
ing in the Far North were identified 
and charged. Decolonization includes 
removing our children from these 
harmful situations and being particu-
larly vigilant in guarding against such 
behavior intruding into our Māori 
immersion schools.
Recovering our territories is 
another crucial part of the decolo-
nization process, but it continues to 
be fraught with difficulties. Despite 
the Waitangi Tribunal upholding our 
claims to our territories, governments 
have refused to discuss, let alone reach 
agreement, with Māori about how 
those territories are to be recovered 
or how the many other breaches of 
the treaty are to be remedied. Instead, 
in 1994, they formulated and then 
imposed a much-resented treaty 
claims settlement policy (Mutu 2011, 
17–24). The primary aim of the policy 
is to retain the power, property, and 
privileges that Pākehā illegitimately 
acquired through their colonization 
process in the colonizers’ hands, to 
bring Māori under their control and 
to silence Māori protest and dissent. 
As a result, an average of less than 1 
percent of lands is being recovered, 
no compensation is being paid, and 
all claims for any and all histori-
cal breaches of the treaty are being 
extinguished fully and finally. Most 
aspects of the claims are not addressed 
before they are extinguished. The 
settlements aim to assimilate Māori 
into the European majority, denying 
Māori self-determination, sovereignty, 
and rights, and relegating Māori to a 
permanent underclass. In June 2013, 
one senior Pākehā media commen-
tator claimed that Māori are being 
empowered to abandon te ao Māori 
(the Māori world) that has so severely 
disadvantaged them (James 2013, 15). 
These and many similar comments are 
designed to perpetuate the myths and 
fantasies conjured to preserve White 
hegemony and privilege. 
Some Pākehā have attacked the 
Māori right to take claims to the 
 Waitangi Tribunal or the courts for 
many years now. They often appear at 
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the select committee hearings object-
ing to Māori receiving anything. 
Some have organized extensive media 
campaigns aimed at preserving Pākehā 
control of the country, unashamedly 
making numerous false statements and 
accusations against Māori communi-
ties. In November 2013, one of the 
leaders of these attacks, Allan Titford, 
was finally unmasked when he was 
convicted and jailed for twenty-four 
years after being found guilty of 
thirty-nine charges including arson, 
threatening to kill, assault with a 
weapon, perjury, assault on a woman 
and children, and sexual violation. 
Over more than twenty years, 
Titford received Pākehā media sup-
port for his attacks on the Treaty of 
Waitangi and on Te Rōroa, the right-
ful owners of land he had purchased 
in Northland. He was responsible for 
the government passing legislation 
that prevents the Waitangi Tribu-
nal making recommendations over 
so-called “private land,” that is, land 
wrongly acquired from its Māori own-
ers and sold to individuals. Titford 
had accused Te Rōroa of lying about 
sacred sites located on property he 
had purchased after he had bull-
dozed them, and of rustling his stock, 
damaging his bulldozer, and burning 
down his house. Pākehā media vilified 
Te Rōroa, labeling them terrorists and 
gangsters. Yet the High Court found 
that far from being a victim, Titford 
was a manipulative liar who burned 
down his own house in an attempt to 
earn sympathy and blacken the name 
of Te Rōroa. His wife, who had turned 
him in to the police, apologized to Te 
Rōroa (Day and Dudding 2013).
The Māori battle against the treaty 
claims settlement policy and process 
over the past twenty years has been 
fought to uphold Māori treaty and 
human rights. It has the backing of 
international experts including the 
UN Human Rights Council. In its 
second Universal Periodic Review 
of New Zealand, which took place 
in January 2014, there were numer-
ous recommendations relating to 
the government’s unacceptable 
treatment of Māori. Three of these 
addressed the need to improve the 
treaty claims  settlement process, while 
another pointed out the need to start 
 implementing and promoting the UN 
 Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples.
Despite the injustices perpetrated 
by the settlement policy and pro-
cess, many claimants have taken a 
pragmatic approach and accepted 
government-determined settlements 
in the mistaken belief that the only 
other option they have is to receive no 
redress at all for their proven claims 
and that money is somehow equiva-
lent to their mana (James 2013, 16). 
In the 2013–2014 reporting period, 
legislation was passed extinguishing 
all the claims of the iwi of Waitaha, 
Ngāti Rangiteaorere, Tapuika and 
Ngāti Rangiwewehi of the Te Arawa 
confederation in the Bay of Plenty; 
Ngāti Koata, Ngāti Rārua, Ngāti 
Tama ki te Tau Ihu, Te Ātiawa o Te 
Waka a Māui, Ngāti Apa ki te Rā Tō, 
Ngāti Kuia, Rangitāne o Wairau and 
Ngāti Toa Rangatira of Te Tau Ihu o 
Te Waka a Māui (the top of the South 
Island) and the south of Te Ika a Māui 
(the North Island); Raukawa of the 
Tainui confederation in the Waikato 
region; and the Maungaharuru-
Tangitū hapū of the Hawke’s Bay 
region. A total of forty-seven settle-
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ments have now been legislated (ots 
2014; mlr 2014).
Large numbers of hapū (group-
ings of extended families) and iwi are 
legally disenfranchised and disempow-
ered by the settlements and register 
their protest in the courts, in the par-
liamentary process, or, most visibly, on 
the streets. Protest against settlements 
is now a permanent feature of the 
process. So is the government’s deter-
mination to ridicule or ignore those 
who point out the glaring injustices it 
perpetrates (Finlayson 2014). Courts 
have been unsympathetic and at times 
hostile to Māori. The under-resourced 
and overworked Waitangi Tribunal 
has been dismissing objections (Jones 
2013, 28). Few claimants can afford 
to appeal their decisions through the 
courts, and in the past those who have 
done so have most often failed. How-
ever, some recent judicial reviews of 
Waitangi Tribunal decisions (Supreme 
Court of New Zealand 2011; High 
Court of New Zealand 2014b) and 
government decisions relating to 
 settlements (High Court of New 
Zealand 2014a) have been at least 
partially successful. 
The last resort of Māori trying to 
curb the greed and excesses of govern-
ments and stop gross injustices has 
often been protest action. When the 
hapū of the country’s largest iwi, 
Ngāpuhi, took to the streets repeat-
edly as the government backed the 
negotiators it preferred against the 
wishes of these hapū, the government 
was eventually forced to acknowl-
edge and talk to them. Throughout 
the entire reporting period, there was 
extensive coverage by Māori media 
of the deep divisions the process had 
fomented within the iwi. Desperate 
attempts by hapū to keep control of 
their claims saw large numbers of 
them resorting to applications to the 
Waitangi Tribunal for urgent hearings 
into the government’s settlement pro-
cess, despite the decreasing confidence 
in the tribunal’s ability to provide 
relief for Māori in these matters (Jones 
2013, 28; Mutu 2014, 210). Govern-
ment attempts to bulldoze through a 
settlement while the tribunal was still 
hearing the claims simply drove claim-
ants onto the streets.
For some who have settled claims, 
Crown apologies made as part of 
their settlements started to sound 
hollow this year as the minister of 
treaty negotiations declined requests 
that government representatives 
attend  ceremonies to commemorate 
the  atrocities the government had 
acknowledged and apologized for. 
Between November 2013 and May 
2014, Tainui and Tauranga Moana iwi 
commemorated the 150th anniversa-
ries of battles they fought when they 
refused to give their lands to British 
settlers in the 1860s and were invaded 
by British troops. Ceremonies were 
conducted at Mangatāwhiri, Rangiriri, 
Waiari Pā, Rangiaowhia, Ōrākau, 
Pukehinahina (Gate Pā), and Te 
Ranga. Calls were made for the true 
history of British colonization to be 
taught in schools and for the battle-
grounds to be relinquished to the hapū 
they belong to so that they can be 
properly cared for. A plea for  British 
wars fought on New Zealand soil to 
be afforded the same recognition as 
those fought overseas was rejected by 
New Zealand’s prime minister.
Battles to protect Māori resources 
continued around the country 
throughout the year. Many hapū 
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mounted protests against mining 
licenses issued for oil drilling in the 
seas off both the east and the west 
coasts, sand mining in south Taranaki, 
coal mining in North Waikato, and 
gold mining at Puhipuhi in North-
land, where previous mercury min-
ing had poisoned waters and led to 
long-term illness among mana whenua 
 (indigenous owners) (Mutu 2014, 
211). The battle continued to force 
insurance companies to remove the 
ship Rena, which had been wrecked 
on Ōtaiti (Astrolabe Reef) off Mōtītī 
island in the Bay of Plenty in 2011 
(Mutu 2013, 168), as did the battle 
to stop the Ruataniwha dam project 
on the Tukituki river in Heretaunga 
(Hawke’s Bay). 
North of Wellington, Te Atiawa 
ki Whakarongotai and Ngāti Awa ki 
Kāpiti finally won their battle to stop 
the New Zealand Transport Agency 
from taking Māori land and destroy-
ing wāhi tapu (sacred places) to build 
the Kāpiti expressway. And in the Far 
North, Ngāti Kahu’s battle to stop 
an American billionaire from build-
ing luxury houses on their burial cave 
ended when he sold the property and 
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Rapa Nui
Rapa Nui decolonization politics 
during the review period have been 
consistent on the island and in Chil-
ean state and international arenas. 
Highlights include: the reelection of 
Leviante Araki as president of Par-
lamento Rapa Nui in August; com-
munity marches for decolonization 
in September; political engagement 
against state plans to privatize and 
develop the Rapa Nui island territory 
of Fundo Vaitea; and advocacy by 
Santi Hitorangi for reenlistment on 
the United Nations list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories (nsgts) during 
the 13th annual UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues in May 2014. 
Initially, there were four candidates 
running for president of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui: Mario Tuki, Ioni Tuki, 
Petero Cardinali, and Leviante Araki 
(the incumbent). However, as Ioni 
Tuki dropped out to focus on fam-
ily responsibilities and Mario Tuki 
canceled his candidacy to concentrate 
on his work as a member of Easter 
Island Development Commission 
(codeipa), Petero Cardinali and 
Leviante Araki ultimately became the 
only two candidates. Public dialogues 
between the two candidates on Radio 
Manukena Rapa Nui, moderated 
by Joel Hucke (a leading member of 
Parlamento Rapa Nui), did not reveal 
significant differences between Araki 
and Cardinali on major social and 
political issues. Candidate answers 
to questions that Hucke posed about 
immigration—a problem the past three 
political reviews have highlighted as 
a focal concern of the community—
stressed the value of continuing to 
“haito te me‘e” (measure the thing), in 
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other words, continuing to study the 
actual extent of the problem. But both 
candidates also agreed that immigra-
tion had to be stopped.  Cardinali 
stated that, ultimately, “He oho 
tātou, he ture ki te gobierno Tire, he 
hakapuru te me‘e ‘i runga o te henua 
nei” (We go fight the Chilean govern-
ment, and close this thing on this 
island). Araki similarly stated, “Ka 
puru te me‘e; te me‘e hanga!” (Close 
the thing [immigration]; [this is] the 
thing desired). In response to ques-
tions about the increasing problems of 
waste and pollution on the island from 
unsustainable tourism, both supported 
added regulation and continued study 
of the problem, stressing that current 
policies administered by Mayor Petero 
Edmunds were failing the island. 
While the candidates clearly agreed 
on the basics of the substantive issues, 
there were subtle—yet critical—dif-
ferences in their political philosophies. 
In response to questions about what 
generally the candidates should work 
toward, Cardinali stated in broad 
philosophical terms: “Ta‘aku pahono 
mo te me‘e nei, he ma‘u te henua nei 
a runga, mai mu‘a ‘ā ki te hora nei. Te 
anga nei, he hakatitika te hora nei; ka 
oho mai ‘ā te ‘ara. Tō matou hā‘ū‘ū te 
anga nei, ma‘u a runga” (My answer 
to this, is to lead the island, from its 
past to its present. The job now is to 
make things straight; to bring forth 
our awakening. This work is coopera-
tive work to lead). Araki, in contrast, 
articulated his goals in a more specific 
formal political register: “Ta‘aku anga 
mo anga, he ma‘u te Rapa Nui. He 
inscribe mo te me‘e decolonización. 
Ka tahi” (My job is to work to lead 
the Rapa Nui. The number one thing 
is to inscribe decolonization). Araki, 
in other words, enunciates his pri-
mary goal as not simply leading Rapa 
Nui or helping its cultural awakening 
but also leading processes for official 
political decolonization, starting with 
inscription on the UN nsgt list.
As leaders met to organize the logis-
tics for the elections, they discussed 
broader aspects of some of the prac-
tices Parlamento Rapa Nui identified 
as part of “me‘e decolonización” 
(decolonization things). Meetings 
emphasizing me‘e decolonización 
involved such matters as the follow-
ing: contesting the Chilean govern-
ment’s desire to expand its control of 
Rapa Nui by administering its marine 
resources and reserves in addition to 
lands, all of which members see as 
violating Rapa Nui rights to self-deter-
mination; writing letters to Bolivian 
President Evo Morales to inform him 
of the ongoing colonial condition of 
Rapa Nui and to request informa-
tion about the Bolivian International 
Court of Justice; and continuing cor-
respondence with Oscar Temaru and 
other Mā‘ohi leaders regarding how 
French Polynesia was inscribed on the 
UN nsgt list—a topic publicized in 
local island media (mv, July 2013). 
In their meetings, Parlamento Rapa 
Nui members also discussed me‘e 
decolonización in terms of a general 
concern with the continued coloniza-
tion of their island and other Pacific 
Island worlds. Parlamento Rapa Nui 
members believe Rapa Nui and other 
Pacific Island nations are victims of 
international discrimination and injus-
tice; they believe they should have the 
opportunity to decolonize and exercise 
self-determination like the postcolo-
nial nations of Africa and Asia. 
In July and August 2013, commu-
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nity politics concentrated on organiz-
ing elections for the president of Par-
lamento Rapa Nui and discussing the 
official listing of Rapa Nui among the 
UN nsgts. Logistical preparations for 
the 4 August 2013 election were orga-
nized in multiple weekly meetings by 
one dozen to two dozen leaders of Par-
lamento Rapa Nui during each week 
of July. At meetings, leaders discussed 
and developed materials and methods 
for registering voters and collecting 
and counting votes. Supervisory and 
organizational responsibilities were 
allocated among members: making 
vote cards, organizing voting rooms, 
checking identification, monitoring 
voting, and so on. Public announce-
ments of the election were coordinated 
on the radio and local television, and 
fliers were distributed to key social 
groups, municipal institutions, and in 
central locations throughout the town 
of Hanga Roa. Written correspon-
dence with the mayor and governor 
authorized holding the elections at the 
local public school, with the support 
of Chilean police to manage traffic 
problems. 
On Sunday morning, 4 August 
2013, Parlamento Rapa Nui lead-
ers raised the Reimiro flags of the 
Rapa Nui nation outside the Chilean-
administered public school, Lorenzo 
Baeza Vega, in Hanga Roa. Ma‘eva 
Ika, a local journalist documenting 
the events, characterized the election 
as illustrating the democratic “trans-
parency” of Parlamento Rapa Nui, 
and voters repeatedly expressed the 
view that the process was very well 
organized. Following an identifica-
tion check, voters entered private 
booths in gender-segregated rooms to 
inscribe their votes for either Araki 
or Cardinali. Voters then placed their 
folded slips in locked boxes and signed 
their names in a supervised log book, 
registering who cast votes among the 
approximately 1,800 registered Rapa 
Nui voters. Joel Hucke coordinated a 
process of vote certification by inter-
national observers from Argentina, 
France, and the United States as well 
as Chilean attorneys, as the votes were 
publicly counted after the elections 
closed Sunday evening. 
Ultimately, Araki was reelected 
president for the next four years, 
 having received 250 votes compared 
to 68 for Cardinali. Though the 
numbers fell short of the total possible 
votes, local journalist Moises Hereveri 
emphasized that key leaders partici-
pated. He stated, “I tu‘u rō atu te nu‘u 
o te Mata o te Rapa Nui” (The people 
that lead the Rapa Nui clans came 
[to vote]) (Tāpura Re‘o, Aug 2013). 
As one of the international observers, 
I was impressed by the diversity of 
voters, including not only elder leaders 
but also significant numbers of youth 
and women. At least 122 votes by 
women were registered, compared to 
160 votes registered by men (36 votes 
were registered under a booth for the 
elderly that was not distinguished by 
gender). Moreover, as the numbers 
resemble the results of another impor-
tant election discussed below, this may 
be more or less the kind of turnout 
one can expect currently in Rapa Nui 
elections. On Monday, hundreds of 
Rapa Nui gathered to hear Araki’s 
acceptance speech and celebrate his 
election with Reimiro flags, traditional 
songs, and a feast prepared from an 
umu (a Polynesian underground oven) 
in an inauguration ceremony staged 
confrontationally in front of the office 
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of the island governor, who is colo-
nially selected by the Chilean president 
rather than the Rapa Nui people. 
Regarding the significance of the 
election, Erity Teave Hey, a regular 
representative of Parlamento Rapa 
Nui at the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues and other interna-
tional forums, emphasized that the 
votes demonstrate that Rapa Nui 
people have “not only consciousness, 
but conviction, decision, and vision 
for the future of the Rapa Nui chil-
dren.” The elections, for her, signify 
that Rapa Nui people will continue 
the process of “self-determination, 
decolonization, and demilitarization; 
this is basically the right for freedom.” 
President Araki stressed that the 
elections were an “important historic 
moment,” as they mark the first time 
the Rapa Nui people have demo-
cratically elected the president of the 
organization. Araki sees the current 
goals of the organization as centered 
on work that will facilitate the devel-
opment of “Rapa Nui based laws” for 
the administration of island resources 
and the Rapa Nui nation. Concurrent 
with the meetings and preparations 
for the election, over twenty Rapa 
Nui leaders from many of the leading 
hua‘ai (extended families, clans) and 
organizations, including Parlamento 
Rapa Nui members, met weekly in a 
private forum independent of Parla-
mento Rapa Nui in July and August 
to discuss and learn about Rapa Nui 
opportunities for decolonization at 
the United Nations. Coordinating 
discussion with UN decolonization 
materials gathered by Santi Hitorangi, 
a Parlamento Rapa Nui member 
based in New York and longtime UN 
representative of Rapa Nui, meetings 
focused on the importance of joining 
the UN list of nsgts and organizing a 
cohort of Rapa Nui to attend the 13th 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues in New York City. A central 
local concern motivating the meetings 
was a heightened sense that Chilean 
state–based institutions and political 
offices, as well as the people occupy-
ing the offices—whether they were 
genealogically Rapa Nui or not—
were, more often than not, serving 
Chilean rather than Rapa Nui inter-
ests and self-determination. Meeting 
participants lamented that in general 
the Rapa Nui community is “mauiui” 
(sick) because of “te manera o te Tire 
‘i runga o te henua” (the Chilean 
ways on the island). Chilean institu-
tions and people administering them 
were characterized in meetings as, 
respectively, “me‘e mai haho” (things 
from outside) and “paihenga o te 
Tire” (Chilean dogs). Alberto Hotus, 
who holds the Chilean-created office 
of president of the Council of Elders 
that replaced the Rapa Nui organized 
Council of Elders, was  especially 
targeted in discussions. Meeting 
participants, who referred to him by 
the derogatory name “Kete” (pock-
ets—as in the pocket of the Chilean 
government), hoped to remove him 
from the office or eliminate the office 
entirely, given that it was not created 
by Rapa Nui. Members stated, “Ta‘e 
o tātou; o te Tire” ([He] is not of us; 
[he] is of Chile). In other words, Kete 
is not seen by actual councils of fam-
ily elders as their representative but 
rather is considered a representative 
of Chile. The expression “paihenga 
o te Tire” is a particularly interesting 
one: paihenga (dog) is metaphorically 
used in Rapa Nui to refer to Chilean 
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police. The metaphor recalls French 
critical philosopher Jacques Rancière’s 
view that the everyday administration 
of society is a policing of the normal-
ized status quo that must be distin-
guished from the real political acts of 
“dissensus” that redistribute a social 
order (Rancière 2010, 92). Instead 
of following the policing paihenga of 
Chilean institutions, meeting par-
ticipants emphasized governing the 
island in terms of Rapa Nui traditions 
by “hakatere hai hua‘ai” (governing 
through family clans)—a tradition the 
participants saw themselves practicing 
within the meetings. 
While these UN-focused meetings 
were being held, some of the Rapa 
Nui leaders present also began orga-
nizing a political march to protest the 
annual Chilean state commemoration 
of the 9 September 1888 signing of a 
treaty between Rapa Nui chiefs and 
Policarpo Toro, representing the Chil-
ean state. This treaty, or “Agreement 
of Wills” was never officially rati-
fied by the state (iwgia 2012, 5–11), 
and it remains of strongly contested 
significance among Rapa Nui (Delsing 
2009, 245–246), despite a recent state 
truth commission designed to stabilize 
its meaning (Gobierno de Chile 2003). 
On 9 September 2013, as state govern-
ment and military officials staged a 
rally at Plaza Atamu Tekena to cel-
ebrate the purported treaty and stra-
tegically modulate its affective signifi-
cance in positive state terms, hundreds 
of Rapa Nui people, coordinated by 
Rapa Nui–determined organizations 
(such as Makenu Re‘o Rapa Nui and 
Parlamento Rapa Nui) as well as Rapa 
Nui–influenced codeipa, engaged 
in a tactical “line of flight” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1985, 9) and marched 
for the decolonization of Rapa Nui. 
While Chilean media dampened the 
significance of the march by depicting 
it merely as a march for “autonomy” 
(bb, 9 Sept 2013), Rapa Nui–based 
media displayed images and expres-
sions that highlighted the march as 
promoting decolonization for inde-
pendence in flags, banners, and even 
bumper stickers (Tāpura Re‘o, Nov 
2013; sr, 9 Sept 2013). Trini Fer-
dinand, a key photographer of the 
event, emphasized that Rapa Nui are 
protesting the Chilean government’s 
“lack of respect and misinterpretation 
of the Treaty of 1888” (sr, 9 Sept 
2013). Mata U‘iroa Atan, a Rapa Nui 
lawyer and politician, represented the 
march as symbolic of a growing Rapa 
Nui social movement toward “un 
proceso decolonización” (a process of 
decolonization) that he sees as critical 
in an era in which Rapa Nui still lack 
governance by Rapa Nui people  acting 
in terms of Rapa Nui–determined 
laws. Recognizing variable forms as 
possible, including free association 
with another state that is not necessar-
ily Chile, he encourages decoloniza-
tion leading to the independence of 
Rapa Nui from Chile (U‘iroa Atan 
2013). Moises Hereveri reflected 
that this march for “independencia” 
(independence) was about “he ture 
tuai era ‘ā te ŋa henua” (a long-
standing fight for the island lands). He 
emphasized that the Rapa Nui must 
continue to  recognize that it is impor-
tant to “kī ō‘ou i tu‘u mana‘u, ‘ina 
ko hakari‘ari‘a” (speak your precious 
thoughts, do not be afraid) (Tāpura 
Re‘o, Nov 2013).
In January 2014, Rafael (Rinko) 
Tuki Tepano, Hanga Roa community–
elected Rapa Nui leader of the Cor-
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poración Nacional de Pueblos Indí-
genas (conadi), spearheaded local, 
national, and international political 
efforts against a state plan established 
under departing Chilean President 
Sebastián Piñera’s administration to 
privatize the lands of the state-claimed 
territory of Fundo Vaitea. Since 1980, 
Chile had indirectly managed the land 
under the private company Sociedad 
Agrícola y Servicios Isla de Pascua 
Limitada (sasipa) through a plan initi-
ated by the administration of former 
Chilean dictator General Augusto 
Pinochet, who began imposing neo-
liberal policies in Chile nationwide 
in 1973 (Munck 2005, 65). sasipa 
management followed fourteen years 
of direct Chilean control under the 
state agency Corporación de Fomento 
de la Produción (corfo), which 
governed the territory following the 
1996 passage of Ley Pascua, which 
established some civil rights for Rapa 
Nui (Gonschor 2011, 181). Piñera’s 
plan had been reportedly organized 
in response to Rapa Nui political 
occupations that resulted in inter-
nationally condemned state violence 
against Rapa Nui in December 2010 
(Young 2012). The plan proposed to 
distribute the 1,052 hectares of land of 
Fundo Vaitea among 264 families in 
plots of 2.5 hectares (ec, 26 Jan 2014; 
bb, 6 Jan 2014). On 1 January 2014, 
the Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales 
(Ministry of National Goods) tried to 
finalize the plan through actions the 
state considered as part of an official 
consultation process with the Rapa 
Nui community (lt, 5 Jan 2014). The 
process was to conclude on 26 Janu-
ary 2014 with community workshops 
to further inform and discuss the 
process of returning the land and a 
plebiscite the same day for the com-
munity to register votes that would 
voice their opinions about the process. 
President Piñera’s appointed governor 
of Easter Island, Rapa Nui Islander 
Carmen Cardinali Paoa, emphasized 
that the plebiscite was an important 
part of the “legal process” (bb, 6 
Jan 2014). Minister of Housing and 
National Assets Rodrigo Perez also 
saw the plan in very positive terms. He 
characterized it as explicitly complying 
with International Labour Organiza-
tion (ilo) Convention 169 on free, 
prior, and informed consent and an 
“unprecedented” return of land—the 
largest in ten years. Government “dra-
matizations” of the events in terms of 
a story of honoring Rapa Nui social 
goals in compliance with international 
law “overcode” the critical content of 
conadi leader Rinko Tuki’s publi-
cized reports (Deleuze 2004). In Janu-
ary 2014, Tuki, in a report cosigned 
by other leading grassroots organi-
zations of Rapa Nui—Parlamento 
Rapa Nui, Makenu Re‘o Rapa Nui, 
Assemblea de Clanes, Autoridades 
Tradicionales de Rapa Nui—empha-
sized that Rapa Nui political rights 
had been violated by the development 
of the plan and the organization of the 
plebiscite. Rather than engaging Rapa 
Nui in an official ilo 169 consulta-
tion mechanism, Tuki represented the 
state as having only applied a “report-
ing mechanism” (cr, 25 Jan 2014). 
As Tuki understands ilo 169, Rapa 
Nui generally, and particularly lead-
ers of codeipa and conadi, should 
have been involved in the processes 
of developing the plan. However, 
Rapa Nui were not given “access to 
technical inputs” that resulted in the 
plan; they were simply given a folder 
political reviews • polynesia 287
with the plan on 1 January 2014 and 
informed to trust the government (cr, 
22 Jan 2014). Instead, Tuki and other 
Rapa Nui leaders immediately recog-
nized that the plan coded the territory 
in ways designed to avoid the need 
to complete an environmental impact 
statement. After scrutinizing the plan, 
Rapa Nui leaders and groups con-
cluded that settling the territory with 
hundreds of new houses would further 
endanger the already unstable water 
supply, hasten increasing problems 
of waste management, and amplify 
questions of sustainability. As the area 
is rich in cultural heritage sites, Rapa 
Nui also noted that the plan could be 
severely destructive of their patrimony. 
Conceiving the Piñera plan as “colo-
nial” and as violating international 
legal conventions on consultation, 
Tuki wrote to UN Special Rapporteur 
James Anaya (cr, 22 Jan 2014) and 
the director of the Chilean National 
Institute of Human Rights, Señora 
Lorena Fries (cr, 23 Jan 2014) to 
request their help to fight Piñera’s plan 
in general and to support Rapa Nui 
desires to delay any plebiscite until 
the Islander groups could study and 
discuss the plan more thoroughly on 
their own. 
On 26 January, on-the-ground, 
active protests were staged by the 
Rapa Nui community, in particular 
members of Parlamento Rapa Nui and 
Makenu Re‘o Rapa Nui, and commu-
nity leaders such as Rinko Tuki and 
Marisol Hitorangi. But the Chilean 
government, coordinated by “a 
heavy police contingent,” proceeded 
with the plebiscite that day (ec, 28 
Jan 2014). Voters were asked three 
questions: whether the Ministerio de 
Bienes Nacionales should continue to 
administer land restitution to Rapa 
Nui people; whether the lands of 
Fundo Vaitea should be distributed to 
the proposed 262 Rapa Nui families 
in agricultural plots of 2.5 acres each; 
and, if the voter voted no to the first 
two questions, which of a set of five 
other options he or she recommended 
for use of the land and its governance 
(cm, 26 Jan 2014). While voters 
approved of the plan to continue to 
restore lands to the Rapa Nui people 
(329 votes in favor, versus 41 against), 
the community rejected the state plan 
to return the Fundo Vaitea lands to 
the families by a margin of 192 to 
168 votes (pu, 10 Feb 2014). Chilean 
officials, had mixed responses to the 
results: Minister Perez saw the plebi-
scite as “a success” because it revealed 
“the real feelings of the Rapa Nui 
people,” while the mayor of Hanga 
Roa, Petero Edmunds Paoa—who 
has promoted development projects 
in the past against Rapa Nui will 
and resigned from being governor in 
2010 amid accusations of corruption 
(Young 2012, 2014)—predictably 
called the results “a setback” to state 
policy (pu, 10 Feb 2014). Rinko Tuki 
extended his critique of the process. 
He challenged the “cultural relevance” 
of the plebiscite questions “since they 
were imposed in Santiago, which 
 prevented their full understanding.” 
And he accused Chile of violating 
Rapa Nui rights to self-determination. 
He stressed, “This Sunday we wit-
nessed a serious violation of our 
 political rights, a process where the 
government has decided the questions, 
the polling station, and used govern-
ment officials from the mainland”  
(ec, 28 Jan 2014). 
With the departure of the Piñera 
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administration and the April inaugu-
ration of the new president of Chile, 
Michelle Bachelet, the Fundo Viatea 
plan appears to be dead. President 
Bachelet, who attended the first 
codeipa meeting under her adminis-
tration on 9 April, promised “the full 
inclusion of indigenous peoples” in 
her administration (ip, 25 April 2014) 
and a “new relationship between the 
State of Chile and Rapa Nui” (bn, 28 
April 2014). Her Ministerio de Bienes 
Nacionales, Victor Osorio, said that 
he hopes to “advance the resolution 
of outstanding issues on the island” 
in terms of the values of the new 
administration (lt, 28 April 2014). 
As the new government attempts to 
distinguish itself from past Chilean 
regimes, however, it is likely Rapa 
Nui will remain skeptical of profound 
difference. They will anticipate state 
dramatizations that simulate “differ-
ence” through “a displacement and a 
disguising within repetition” (Deleuze 
1994, xx). International human rights 
organizations have been repeatedly 
challenging Chilean state policies 
toward indigenous peoples. In May, 
Amnesty International encouraged 
President Bachelet to pursue a differ-
ent policy for the indigenous peoples 
of Chile so that “human rights do not 
remain on paper” (me, 16 May 2014). 
Of particular concern to Amnesty 
International, amplifying the struggles 
of Rapa Nui against Chilean adminis-
tration of Fundo Vaitea, is Chile’s lack 
of implementation of ilo 169 con-
ventions of free, prior, and informed 
consent, but also its application of a 
Pinochet-era anti-terrorist law that the 
Piñera administration applied in con-
flicts with indigenous peoples includ-
ing Rapa Nui. Amnesty International’s 
concerns build on those of UN Special 
Rapporteur James Anaya, who also 
continues to challenge these policies of 
the Chilean government (me, 16 May 
2014; ru, 14 April 2014), as well as 
the UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (2013). The 
issues stem from Decrees 124, 66, and 
40 that the Chilean state legislated 
to implement ilo convention 169 
following government ratification of 
the convention in 2008. Decree 124, 
implemented by Bachelet in her first 
presidential administration (2006–
2010), was found by indigenous 
peoples of Chile, UN officials, and 
international nongovernmental organi-
zations to violate ilo 169; its supple-
mental replacements, Decrees 66 and 
40, issued during the Piñera adminis-
tration, remain similarly contested at 
indigenous, state, and international 
levels (Americas  Quarterly 2014). 
Despite her promises for difference, 
President Bachelet’s administrative 
 history does not suggest much hope 
for real change. 
At the 13th UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, held on 13–14 
May 2014, Santi Hitorangi advocated 
for the political decolonization of 
the Rapa Nui nation from the state 
of Chile during the “Decolonization 
Dialogues” at the UN Church Cen-
ter in New York City. The dialogues 
were addressed to an audience of over 
a hundred participants of the UN 
Permanent Forum and were spon-
sored by the General Board of Church 
and Society of the United Method-
ist Church, the World Council of 
Churches, United Methodist Women, 
and members of the Decolonization 
Alliance organization housed at UN 
Plaza. Emphasizing that decoloniza-
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tion must engage cultural minds, 
social bodies, and state governments, 
both political and theological decolo-
nization were discussed during the 
dialogues. Hitorangi, a panel speaker, 
was joined by fellow Decoloniza-
tion Alliance members of the Pacific 
Islands: Menase W Kaisiepo and Rosa 
Moiwend advocated for the political 
decolonization of West Papua, and 
Leon K Siu advocated for the politi-
cal decolonization of Hawai‘i. While 
engaged with the theological discus-
sions of church panel members that 
criticized the historical and ongoing 
institutional role of Christianity in 
the destruction of indigenous peoples’ 
cultures, lands, and natural resources 
worldwide (umw, May 2014), 
Hitorangi’s presentation articulated 
more with the concerns of moderator 
Reverend Liberato Bautista (United 
Methodist Church representative to 
the United Nations) that the three 
Pacific Island nations represented 
by members of the Decolonization 
Alliance were, in a sense, “political 
prisoners.” Hitorangi traced Chilean 
colonial history in Rapa Nui to late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century 
violations of the terms of the afore-
mentioned 1888 political treaty, which 
Rapa Nui see as having been drafted, 
wrongfully translated, and signed 
under fraudulent and duplicitous cir-
cumstances. In light of the internation-
ally documented 2010 state violence 
of Chile against Rapa Nui people 
(iwgia 2012), Hitorangi stressed that 
it is clear that “Chile keeps Rapa Nui 
by guns” and that Rapa Nui “remains 
a colony of Chile.” 
As a founding member of the 
Decolonization Alliance, Hitorangi 
emphasized that the organization is 
striving to develop a “coordinating 
structure” to access the UN decolo-
nization process. In part, this struc-
ture would assist colonially occupied 
nations with the process of becoming 
listed as nsgts by the United Nations. 
Alliance members see themselves 
developing the coordinating  structure 
in response to recent UN reports 
and resolutions: the “Study on the 
Decolonization of the Pacific Region” 
presented at the 12th UN Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues by 
Pacific Caucus leader Valmaine Toki 
and submitted to the UN Economic 
and Social Council (2013); the May 
2013 UN General Assembly  adoption 
of a resolution asserting the right of 
French Polynesia to self-determination 
and decolonization; and the July 
2013 UN Human Rights Council 
Report of the Independent Expert 
authored by Alfred-Maurice de Zayas 
on the  promotion of a democratic 
and  equitable international order. 
 Consistent with the concerns of 
Parlamento Rapa Nui members as 
noted in the beginning of this review, 
Toki’s study stresses that “decoloniza-
tion in the Pacific does not follow the 
precedent set by Asia, Africa and the 
Caribbean” and encourages the United 
Nations to consider “convening an 
expert group meeting on the decoloni-
zation of the Pacific.” The study offers 
detailed reasoning for considering the 
decolonization of New Caledonia, 
Hawai‘i, West Papua, and French 
Polynesia and explicitly problematizes 
the colonial status of Rapa Nui. It 
stresses that “Chile maintains con-
trol over Easter Island (Rapa Nui)” 
and highlights that Rapa Nui people 
have recently become criminalized as 
“terrorists” in contexts of “peacefully 
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demanding that their human rights be 
respected.” 
Hitorangi depicted both Toki’s 
study of decolonization in the Pacific 
Islands and the resolution adopted 
on the right of French Polynesia to 
self-determination as positively articu-
lating with de Zayas’s report. That 
report notes that a “spirit of interna-
tional solidarity” is increasingly being 
undermined by state governments 
that are more responsive to “special 
interests such as the military-industrial 
complex, financial bankers, and 
transnational corporations” than to 
the peoples of the world. In contrast, 
indigenous people “maintain that the 
right of self-determination cannot 
be exercised against the will of the 
population concerned, and that self-
determination referenda should only 
allow the indigenous to vote and not 
the colonizers” (UN General Assem-
bly Human Rights Council 2013, 5, 
6, 11). Reform of UN instruments of 
self-determination is highlighted in 
this report by de Zayas as generally 
critical for the development of a more 
democratic and equitable international 
order, particularly for indigenous 
peoples.
Santi Hitorangi’s advocacy for the 
Rapa Nui decolonization alliance 
is the second time he has engaged 
the United Nations in 2014 as an 
advocate for Rapa Nui rights. On 7 
February, he provided a statement of 
intervention at the Eighth Session of 
the Open Work Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals of the UN Mil-
lennium Development Goals Forum 
(sr, 10 Feb 2014). The intervention 
highlighted the lack of consultation of 
Rapa Nui in the Trans Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership (tpp) neoliberal 
free-trade agreement being developed 
between Chile and other signatories 
(Australia, Brunei, Canada, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the 
United States). Hitorangi fears the 
tpp will result in the further “opening 
of the door for privatization of our 
natural resources without our con-
sent.” In speaking at the UN Church 
Center and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals Forum, Hitorangi 
is fundamentally seeking to strengthen 
Rapa Nui capacity for realizing their 
human rights to self-determination at 
an official international level. Yet, at 
an abstract level, Hitorangi’s interven-
tions on behalf of the Rapa Nui nation 
articulate with universal concerns for 
improving global social justice. The 
movement for indigenous rights is part 
of a general “international program to 
advance human rights” (Anaya 2009, 
1). As UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Navi Pillay has recently 
noted, the rights of indigenous peoples 
are “essential for the promotion and 
protection of all other human rights” 
(Barkan and Pillay 2014).
As the review period closes, inter-
national media report that the eco-
logical and social sustainability of 
Chile’s development of Easter Island 
is facing increasingly severe problems 
(bbc, 17 April 2014). While Rapa 
Nui remain, in Reverend Bautista’s 
words, “political prisoners” subject 
to unsustainable state policies, armed 
plebiscites determined by the Chilean 
Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, and 
international ttp projects without 
reliable access to internationally legal 
forms of free, prior, and informed 
consent, their decolonializing everyday 
practices and key political acts during 
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the year in review have been constant. 
Rapa Nui engagement illustrates 
an increasing trend in international 
indigenous politics: social movement 
beyond state politics of recognition 
and toward a “politics of refusal” of 
what settler colonial states consider 
officially settled (Simpson 2014, 
11–12). While Rapa Nui refusal is, in 
part, necessarily reactive, an affective 
and affirmative “politics of hope” 
is manifest in the ways Rapa Nui 
are “navigating movements” within 
global and Chilean assemblages of 
power (Massumi and Zournazi 2002). 
While Rapa Nui leaders like Rinko 
Tuki react to Chilean plans by work-
ing in part within Chilean-determined 
institutions, Tuki’s consultation 
with UN Special Rapporteur James 
Anaya illustrates Rapa Nui capacity 
to affirm rights through alternative 
international discourse networks. 
The democratic and  internationally 
transparent election of  Leviante Araki 
as president of Parlamento Rapa Nui 
discloses—powerfully—not only that 
Rapa Nui are building capacity for 
self-determination but also that they 
are already affirming government by 
their own democratic institutions. 
Santi Hitorangi’s interventions at the 
United Nations for official decoloniza-
tion of Rapa Nui, grounded in New 
York coordination of Rapa Nui–based 
meetings for UN representation, 
illustrate that Rapa Nui are not only 
building capacity for international 
diplomacy but are also already affirm-
ing pathways of international political 
engagement. Rapa Nui hope is grow-
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